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Preface
Evaluating the effects of reforms to New Zealand's agricultural policy is a topic of
enduring interest, especially in recent years. This Research Report examines an
important aspect of farm structure (family and corporate farms) with a particular emphasis
on documenting the relative importance of family farming and the economic factors
interlaying its success in a deregulated environment. This report will be of interest to
observers and commentators on New Zealand agricultural change, especially those in
other countries who are concerned with reforms to agricultural policy.
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CHAPTER ONE
ISSUE, FOCUS, AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY
The prevailing opinion-particularly among European-politicians, policy-makers as well as
economists is that it is only due to state support that farming in Europe is still mostly
dominated by family farms and not by large corporate .firms. Researchers have long
predicted the demise of the family farm, arguing that larger, more capitalized farms are
better able to take advantage of sophisticated, productivity-enhancing technology and
therefore have a competitive advantage. Hence, the fear is that without state support of the
family farm, this organizational form will be forced out by the capital-oriented corporation
just as has happened in most other sectors of the economy. However, does the
organizational form of the family farm indeed only survive thanks to agricultural policies
supporting it, or is this form of organization in agriculture competitive against alternative
forms so that it does not need specific support to survive?l In other words, what are the key
factors underlying the incidence offamily farming?
These questions are of particular interest in Europe at a time when agricultural
policies-which heavily subsidise farms-are being reformed, and the future of former big
state-owned farms is being discussed.
On the one hand, the literature has pondered these questions extensively (Chayanov 1966;
Brewster 1950; Georgescu-Roegen 1976; Nakano 1979; Mann and Dickinson 1980; Vogeler
1981; Gasson et al. 1988; Reinhardt and Barlett 1989; Schmitt 1989; and others); on the
other hand, however, the debate over the fate of the family farm lacks empirical evidence
of the persistence of family farming in a modem market-oriented agriculture characterized
by the absence of programmes, such as income supports, price supports, import barriers etc.,
which, some more specifically than others, are designed to support the organizational form
of the family farm. We try to close this gap with this study.
To do this, we first had to find an agriculture whose institutional and natural qualities offer
ideal conditions for the falsification of our hypothesis that the organizational form of family
farms is competitive against alternative forms of organization, and therefore, that family
farming survives without state support. We considered conditions for the falsification of our
hypothesis to be ideal in an agriculture which, first, is highly exposed to international
markets, second, provides minimal state support to its farmers, and third, which is
characterized by the absence of institutional and natural barriers to expansion in farm size
and the establishment of alternative forms of organization.
New Zealand agriculture meets all these requirements. The withdrawal of practically all
government assistance to the agricultural sector in 1984, has turned New Zealand agriculture
into the most market-oriented among OECD member states, fully exposing its highly export-
1 This question must not be confused with the debate over the fate of the agricultural sector as a
whole. It solely asks about the competitiveness of the family farm vis-a-vis alternative forms of farm
organisation given an agricultural sector exists.
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oriented farmers to the vagaries of international markets. Moreover, natural and institutional
conditions in New Zealand have placed minimal limitations on the establishment of large
farms and alternative forms of farm organization such as the corporate form; hence, those
farm sizes and structures could evolve which have the greatest potential to exploit whatever
advantages may exist.
Our study is structured as follows. We start our analysis, in Chapter 2, with a description
of the agricultural structure that evolved in New Zealand. Thus, in a first step, we consider
the position and persistence of family farming vis-a.-vis alternative forms of farm organization
in New Zealand agriculture. The position of family farming is described in terms of its
percentage of all farms, its contribution to total agricultural output, and in terms of its share
of all the farmland. We conjectured that production characteristics affect the status of family
farming; hence, the status of family farming is shown for six different production systems,
or so-called agricultural industries, namely the dairy, sheep/beef, poultry, pig, crop, and
horticulture industries. Moreover, since the implementation of the economic liberalisation
programme in 1984 brought sweeping changes to agricultural assistance, the study analyses
the agricultural structure before, during and after the deregulation of the agricultural sector.
We will find, first, that the family farm is the dominant form of organization in New Zealand
despite the absence of state support; and second, that the degree of family farming is not
uniform across the various agricultural industries.
Hence in a second step, in Chapter 3, we analyse the determinants of the form of
organization in agriculture, and explain the variation in the degree of family farming across
the different agricultural industries. Our view is that economies of scale and transaction
costs-the latter in the sense of costs of coordination and agency costs-are key determinants
of the structure and size of firms. However, unlike the typical firm in industry, the family
farm is an amalgamation of household and firm. Hence, unlike most firms, a family farm
may not produce commodities solely for the market; it may also produce goods and services
for household consumption. Among those goods and services supplied to the household may
be non-pecuniary benefits such as job satisfaction, social prestige, independence etc.
Consequently, the behaviour of family farms cannot be adequately understood by an approach
which ignores the farm family's non-pecuniary returns from farming; for the farm family
maximizes its utility function subject to its full income constraint, which comprises both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. Hence, we regard the non-pecuniary benefits accruing
to the farm family from farming as another key factor that needs to be considered in order
to understand the incidence of family farming in agriculture without state support.
In Chapter 4, we ask whether the features of those factors underlying the incidence of family
farming in New Zealand are unique to that particular environment; in other words, can our
findings concerning the persistence of family farming without state intervention in New
Zealand agriculture be applied to other market-economies, despite their different settings, or
do the agricultural settings for instance in Europe and the USA influence the identified
determinants of family farming in a way that we cannot draw any conclusions and
implications for agricultural policies for those settings from our observations in New
Zealand? Chapter 5 summarizes the study.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE STATUS OF FAMILY FARMING
IN NEW ZEALAND
This chapter considers the position and persistence of the family farm in a modem agriculture
with negligible state support such as New Zealand's. As an introduction, the historical and
current contexts of New Zealand agriculture are first described in Section 2.1. Section 2.2
describes the method and materials used. Section 2.3 illustrates the empirical findings
concerning the status of family farming in New Zealand agriculture. Section 2.4 draws
conclusions.
2.1 Introduction
In order to appreciate the significance of the results concerning the position and persistence
of family farming in New Zealand, it is necessary to understand the evolution of agriculture
in early New Zealand, the nature and position of the agricultural sector within the New
Zealand economy, and the agricultural policy before and after the economic liberalisation
programrne was initiated in 1984.
2.1.1 Evolution of Agriculture in Early New Zealand2
The impetus for early agricultural production in New Zealand came from British capitalists,
in search of profitable ventures. The abundance of unsettled land offered them investment
opportunities in a British colony that generated attractive returns on investment in comparison
to Britain. As a result, capitalist pastoralism in the form of large landed estates rapidly
spread throughout the available grassland areas. Contrary to Britain where landowners left
production to tenant farmers, most estate-owners in New Zealand participated directly in the
running of their farm operation.
With the completion of the geographical expansion land became a scarce commodity. In the
1870s, land prices started to rise sharply because of the continued flow of capital to New
Zealand. Investment opportunities in land were now limited; capitalists became increasingly
involved in trade, marketing, and processing of the rapidly increasing volume of commodities
being produced for export. By 1890, after only two decades of profitable commodity
production, estate-owners faced an increasing cost-price squeeze due to continuously rising
land prices and decreasing commodity prices, reducing returns on capital in pastoral
production significantly.
2 TIlis section is based on Fairweather's (1 <)82) analysis of the development of the agricultural
structure in New Zealand from first settlement in the mid-19th century through to the beginning of the 20th
century.
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The decline in profitability in large-scale pastoral production was accompanied by a growing
demand for land by small-scale farm families. Besides farming land unsuitable for large-
scale pastoralism, small farm settler families provided the needed labour for contract and
seasonal work on large estates. The availability of land for small-scale farming in fact
prevented the development of a labour force cut off from land.
Both small-scale farmers and estate-owners faced declining commodity prices. However,
family farms had the advantage that they were not constrained by the necessity of paying
wage labour, because they relied heavily on unpaid family labour. Estate-owners trying to
secure the viability of their estates in the increasingly competitive climate had two options:
intensifying production or selling part of the land. However, the benefits of intensive
production on a large scale were eroded by the counter-productive effects of a large number
of hired labourers and by soil fertility depletion. Because estate-owners were not tied to a
particular piece of land,-they regarded land as a commodity, which could be sold if
circumstances required it-, selling land, the second option, became a feasible alternative for
estate-owners to secure a positive return on capital invested in agricultural production.
As production techniques increased labour productivity and marketing changedto suit smaller
farms, the size of farm that could provide sufficient income to support a family declined, and
conversely, the number of family farms grew. Hence, the structural changes in agriculture
at the beginning of the 20th century were characterized by a marked increase in the number
of middle-sized farms, and an equal decline in both the proportion of very small and very
large farms.
2.1.2 The Current Role of Agriculture in the Economy
With a population of less than 4 million and an area of 26.8 million hectares (Department
of Statistics), two important features of the New Zealand economy are its small size and the
abundance of productive land relative to the size of population. Due to this specific resource
mix, the pattern of economic development in New Zealand has been different from that in
countries with a similar level of wealth (Rayner 1990): first, New Zealand has never
experienced a phase in economic development where industry dominated the economy, and
second, agriculture continues to play a special role in the economy. The smallness of the
domestic market has not permitted the efficient production of a wide range of manufactured
goods in New Zealand, so that a large part of production has typically gone into the
production of food and fibre products which could be traded on world markets for
manufactured goods. Hence, New Zealand agriculture has traditionally been dependent on
world markets (Tyler and Lattimore 1990).
While the importance of the agricultural sector has declined since the 1970s as the percentage
contribution of agriculture to GDP in table 2.1 shows, agriculture has retained a significant
role in the economy employing 9 percent of the New Zealand workforce and contributing
over half of total exports in 1993 (Department of Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries) .
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Table 2.1
Contribution of Agriculture to Gross Domestic Product
Years 1971 1976 1981 1984 1987 1990 1991 1992 1993
Agriculture as % of GOP 10.1 9.2 9.4 5.9 5.5 6.0 5.3 5.9 6.4
Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Situation
and Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture.
New Zealand agriculture is mainly pastoral farming with two major agricultural industries:
the dairy and sheep/beef industries. Despite farm diversification, which increased
horticulture's share of total agricultural output from 2 percent in 1977 to 9 percent in 1993,
the dairy and sheep/beef industries' output of the four traditional pastoral commodities wool,
sheepmeat, beef, and dairy products still comprise 60 percent (1993) of agricultural output
(Department of Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries). The importance of pastoral
production is further highlighted in Table 2.2 which shows the contribution of agriculture to
total exports earnings; between 1984 and 1993 pastoral farming contributed 85 percent to 90
percent to total agricultural export earnings and 44 percent to 55 percent to total exports.
Because of the relative smallness of the domestic market New Zealand agriculture has
traditionally focused on world markets (Rayner 1990). The high percentage of total
production going into exports, shown in Table 2.3, emphasizes the high exposure of the
agricultural sector to world markets; this inevitably renders farmers vulnerable to price
fluctuations, import restrictions, and other trade barriers in international markets (Lattimore
and Rae 1990; Reynolds and Moore 1990; Bollard and Mayes 1993).
Table 2.2
Contribution of Agriculture to New Zealand Export Earnings
June Years 1984 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
(in Percent)
Wool 13.4 12.4 9.1 6.4 6.3 4.9
Meat 20.7 16.8 16.1 17.3 17.6 16.9
Dairy 16.9 15.3 17.3 16.1 16.3 17.4
Livestock 0.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0
Other Animal Products 4.0 5.6 5.0 4.3 4.1 3.9
Total Pastoral 55.7 51.6 48.8 45.3 45.4 44.1
Fruit & Cereals 5.1 6.3 7.0 7.2 7.5 6.2
Total Agriculture 60.9 57.9 55.8 52.5 52.9 50.3
Source: NZ Meat and Wool Boards' Economics Service, Annual Review of the New Zealand Sheep and
Beef Industry
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As a result of the abundance of land the average size of farm holding is relatively large. In
1991 the average farm comprised 217 hectares compared to 277 hectares in 1984
(Department of Statistics). The decline in average farm size is explained, on the one hand,
by an increase during the same period in the number of holdings from 76,633 to over 80,000
due to the growth in horticultural products, other niche products (e.g. wine, flowers, and
herbs), and lifestyle farms in the vicinity of urban centres (Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries), and on the other hand, by the reduction in the total farming area (Department of
Statistics) . In 1991, 78 percent of the 17.5 million hectares of farmland were used in
pastoral agriculture, while horticulture, forestry, and other land use comprised 2 percent, 7
percent, and 13 percent respectively (Department of Statistics). In short, New Zealand
agriculture is dominated by pastoral dairy and sheep/beef farms. While the role of
agriculture within the economy as a whole has been declining, it has remained an important
sector in foreign trade. As a result of the dependence on export markets New Zealand
farmers are greatly exposed to the vagaries of international markets.
Table 2.3
Exports as Percentage of Total Production by Commodity
June Years 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Lamb 95 95 93 95 90
Mutton 58 56 57 61 68
Beef and Veal 83 80 83 83 81
Wool 81 67 67 101 93
Dairy Products 89 82 88 90 86
Apples 58 56 56 54 53
Kiwifruit 80 88 90 90 90
Note: Percentage of meat exports is mea')ured on a bone-in ba')is.
Source: Department of Statistics, Agricultural Statistics; Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Situation and
Outlook for New Zealand Agriculture; NZ Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service, Annual Review of
the New Zealand Sheep and Beef Industry.
2.1.3 A~sistance to Agriculture
For a long time New Zealand was able to combine an import substitution policy, sheltering
its small domestic industry from external competition, and economic growth (Rayner 1990;
Bollard and Mayes 1993). Thanks to the boom in agricultural commodity prices after the
Second World War and Korean War, and the traditional role as a supplier of food and raw
materials to the UK market (Lattimore and Rae 1990), New Zealand enjoyed, together with
Switzerland, the third highest per capita GNP in the- world in the 1950s (Johnston and
Frengley 1991). In the following two decades, however, New Zealand's economic
environment changed dramatically. Falling world prices due to advances in agricultural
technology, increased protectionism in agricultural markets, and in particular, Britain's entry
into the European common market in 1973-which meant that Britain adopted the higher
protective barriers of the European Community-all created immense problems for the
agricultural export sector and, consequently, for the entire economy (Lattimore and Rae
1990; Rayner 1990; Johnston and Frengley 1991). This situation made it increasingly
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difficult to sustain the protectionist industrial policy as declining terms of trade (Reynolds and
Moore 1990) created a serious problem of imbalance in the external accounts (Rayner 1990;
Tyler and Lattimore 1990). In an attempt to rectify this imbalance it was decided to
encourage the expansion of pastoral output as pastoral agriculture was recognized as
potentially capable of a significant increase in output which could improve export revenues
and recover growth in living standards (Tyler and Lattimore 1990; Frengley and Johnston
1992) . This marked the beginning of two decades of state intervention in the agricultural
sector. The following is an overview of the course and effects of agricultural assistance since
its infancy in the early 1960s. For a detailed analysis see, Cloke (1989), Sandrey and
Reynolds (eds.) (1990), Johnston and Frengley (1991), Fairweather (1992), Frengley and
Johnston (1992), and Bollard and Mayes (1993).
Agricultural Policy before 1984
The course of assistance to agriculture before 1984 was characterized by three steps
(Johnston and Frengley 1991). Initially, government intervention was limited to setting
indicative growth targets and to providing sufficient financial resources for growth in output.
The intention was to reach the target of 111 million livestock "ewe equivalents" by 1972.
Within a decade stock numbers indeed increased significantly; however, inflation-induced
cost increases, falling wool prices, and drought stopped growth short of the set target. As
a result, the initial phase of agricultural assistance was followed in the 1970s by a decade of
increased market intervention.. A variety of policy instruments, such as increased funding
for extension, research, and quality control, tax incentives, increased fertilizer subsidies, and
price stabilization policies which included heavily subsidized loans to producer boards were
introduced to further stimulate the production of agricultural export commodities. However,
the impact on pastoral output remained minimal; poor seasons and inadequate terms of
exchange (Reynolds and Moore 1990) limited further increases to only 1 percent between
1969 and 1979 (Frengley and Johnston 1992). In a final attempt to spur pastoral output,
agricultural assistance was significantly stepped up in 1978/79 with the introduction of the
Supplementary Minimum Price (SMP) scheme for sheep and cattle. By guaranteeing
minimum floor prices, this programme protected the farmers against adverse terms of trade
and was therefore conceived as a suitable instrument to further encourage investment in
livestock production (Johnston and Frengley 1991). An illustration of the extensive package
of government intervention policies in place by the 1980s is given in Table 2.4.
In short, government assistance had progressed through three phases before 1984 (Johnston
and Frengley 1991): first, the indicative planning phase accompanied by the provision of
adequate resources (1962-72); second, price and capital subsidies to mitigate rising input
costs (1972-79); and third, direct output commodity price support (1979-84).
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Type of Intervention
Input Subsidies
Table 2.4
New Zealand's Intervention Policies before 1984
Chief &amp/eM
Fertilizer Subsidies
Interest rate concessions
Production subsidies
Development schemes
Research and services
Producer board subsidies
Tax expenditures
Industry control
Producer board legislation
State ownership
Source: Cloke (1989)
Irrigation subsidies
Electricity subsidies
Supplementary minimum prices
Livestock incentive scheme
Land development loans
MAF health and research
Interest rate concessions
Investment allowances
Export incentives
Town milk industry
Egg industry
NZ Meat Producer Board
Dairy Board
Apple and Pear Board
Rural Banking and Finance Corporation
The rate Of assistance was low in 1970, but significant in 1975, with a percentage Producer
Subsidy Equivalent (pSE)3 of 3 percent and 24 percent respectively. In 1983 assistance
peaked with a percentage PSE of 35 percent for a major slump in world commodity prices
had led to an escalation of support provided by SMPs and stabilisation payments (Tyler and
Lattimore 1990). Table 2.5 shows that government assistance to agriculture at its height had
reached a level that was higher than in other agricultural exporting countries such as
Australia, Canada, EC, and the United States.
3 The Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) is a mea"ure of the value of transfers to farmers generated
by agricultural policy; the Percentage PSE expre;;;ses the PSE as a percentage of the value of production.
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Table 2.5
Percentage Producer Subsidy Equivalent~, All Product~
Year 1983 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Australia 13 9 9 13 14 11 9
Canada 28 43 40 49 48 38 31
EC 34 46 41 46 49 47 49
Japan 63 74 70 66 67 73 72
New Zealand 35 7 5 5 4 3 3
Switzerland 68 77 72 79 79 77 80
United States 26 32 26 27 27 22 23
Source: OECD, Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade
Pastoral agriculture with its four major commodities milk, beef, sheepmeat, and wool had
been by far the main beneficiary of government assistance. However, as Table 2.6
illustrates, there were significant disparities between levels of assistance to each of the four
commodities. Compared to assistance allocated to the sheep industry's output of sheepmeat
and wool, assistance to beef and milk production remained moderate between 1979.and 1986.
As a result of the preferential status of sheep vis-a-vis beef farming, the farm mix of
sheep/beef farms was skewed to sheep production (Reynolds and Moore 1990), and
generally, acted as a disincentive to diversification (Rayner 1990).
9
Table 2.6
Producer Subsidy Equivalents for New Zealand per Commodity
average
1979-86 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Milk
Net total PSE NZ$mn 275 186 76 64 52 42 39 40
Net Percentage PSE % 23 13 4 3 3 2 2 2
Beef and Veal
Net total PSE NZ$mn 104 115 72 55 60 37 32 28
Net Percentage PSE % 14 12 6 5 4 3 2 2
Pigmeat
Net total PSE NZ$mn 15 5 3 2 2 2 1 1
Net Percentage PSE % 16 4 3 2 1 1 1 1
Poultry
Net total PSE NZ$mn 20 62 57 50 51 52 43 61
Net Percentage PSE % 31 62 51 40 42 41 32 42
Sheepmeat
Net total PSE NZ$mn 384 99 67 47 40 29 25 24
Net Percentage PSE % 52 14 11 5 4 3 2 2
Wool
Net total PSE NZ$mn 179 149 80 59 52 43 34 12
Net Percentage PSE % 18 11 5 5 6 5 5 2
Eggs
Net total PSE NZ$mn 30 29 34 40 23 4 5 5
Net Percentage PSE % 40 34 41 44 27 5 6 7
Crops
Net total PSE NZ$mn 17 11 10 12 7 6 4 2
Net Percentage PSE % 9 9 7 6 4 3 2 1
All Products
Net total PSE NZ$ mn 1,023 656 399 328 286 214 182 174
Net Percentage PSE % 24 13 7 5 5 4 3 3
Source: OECD, Agricultural Policies, Markets and Trade
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Agricultural Policy Refonll
Government assistance to New Zealand agriculture came to an abrupt end in 1984 with a
change of government that was brought about by the nationwide recognition that the fiscal
deficit and overseas debt caused by market intervention and social assistance policies-for
which the country had been well known during the post World War II period-had imposed
unsustainably high costs on the economy (Johnston and Frengley 1991). The new Labour
government implemented the most comprehensive economic reform programme undertaken
by any OECD country in recent decades (OECD 1991; Bollard and Mayes 1993); it changed
the economy radically from one which had become progressively reliant on government
assistance and intervention to one of clearer market orientation (Johnston and Frengley 1991).
In the light of the new policy, the cost of supporting agriculture was perceived as
unacceptably heavy. Consequently, the government announced the phasing out of support
to agriculture; the agricultural sector was to be fully exposed to world market conditions
(Johnston and Frengley 1991). In contrast to the slow reform of the Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP), policy changes in New Zealand were swift and radical (Cloke 1989; Bollard
and Mayes 1993); in three years, most state support for agriculture was removed. Almost
the only area of assistance that has remained are general services, such as research, pest and
disease control etc., and the statutory powers of producer boards (OECD 1993; Bollard and
Mayes 1993). Table 2.5 illustrates the sharp drop in assistance to agriculture that occurred
after the initiation of the new economic policy: by 1988, New Zealand's rate of assistance
to agriculture had drop from 35 percent in 1983 to a percentage PSE of 7 percent, and by
1992 to 3 percent, in other words to a level that was significantly lower than those of its
competitors in international commodity markets, namely those of Australia, Canada, EC, and
the United States. Table 2.6 shows that in 1993, only poultry and eggs, two minor
commodities, had an estimated rate of assistance that was higher than 4 percent of the value
of production.
The impact of the new policy on farmers was profound. The withdrawal of input and output
subsidies led to increased costs and a fall in prices at a time when the main agricultural
export commodities-with the exception of wool-faced static or declining markets (Bywater
et al. 1993). Moreover, the concurrent deregulation of the financial markets caused interest
rates and the exchange rate to rise, and thus, further exacerbated both the cost and return
side of farm operations. Thus, the new policy rapidly and drastically changed the net
incomes and equity of farmers, causing significant stress in the farming community,
particularly for those farmers who had borrowed funds at subsidised interest rates to increase
output or expand farm holdings at inflated land prices (Johnston and Frengley 1991).
However, by 1992 the nominal exchange rate, inflation rate, and thus nominal interest rates
had dropped enough to restore competitiveness for the agricultural sector. Despite continuing
high assistance. to agriculture overseas, New Zealand farmers had now become competitive
again by world standards; hence, exports rose significantly (Bollard and Mayes 1993;
Bywater et al. 1993),
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2.2 Method and Materials
This section first gives a definition of the 'family farm' -in contrast to the 'family-managed
farm' and 'corporate farm' -which is used as a working concept; it then describes the
objectives of the method, the materials and other definitions used for the investigation of the
position and persistence of the family farm in New Zealand agriculture.
2.2.1 Definition of the Family Farm
Naturally, the measurement of the status of family farming requires an operational definition
of the 'family farm'. However, as Nikolitch (1969) states defining the family farm is not
an easy task for the meaning of the term changes over time, and-due to the deep emotional
appeal of the subject-means different things to different people. An early perception of the
family farm was that the farm family owned the land, relied on family labour, made all
management decisions, was as self-sufficient as possible, and earned their livelihood with
farming. Later conceptions dropped the vision of self-sufficiency and that the farm should
provide a livelihood for the family, and defined the family farm as an agricultural business
in which the owner of the farm is a risk-taking manager, who performs most of the
managerial activities, and does most of the farmwork with his family (Nikolitch 1969).
Likewise, the concept adopted for this study defines the family farm in terms of farm labour
input, farm management, and farm ownership, emphasizing the importance of the link
between the farm household and the farm business in family farms.
The first defining feature of the family farm is that the farmer is a risk-taking manager who
carries responsibility for the farm business as farm owner, sharefarmer, or tenant; hence,
the farmer of a family farm-unlike the absentee-owner-is part of the farm labour force
and-unlike the manager of a corporate firm-accountable to his creditors. Second, the
farmer, or farm family, mvns no less than halfof the farm business comprising stock, plant
and machinery on the farmed land.
These criteria distinguish the family farm from the corporate farm for which the separation
of business ownership and managerial control is constitutional. Furthermore, by exempting
land from the ownership criterion, they avoid the exclusion of tenant and sharefarmers, who,
like owner-operators, take management decisions with little or no interference from
landowners, and, who reap to a great extent the benefits of their productive effort.
A third criterion is necessary to distinguish between the family farm, or say family-worked
farm from the family-managed farm. While both meet the first and second condition, they
differ with regard to total labour input. On the widely accepted assumption that the farm
family household has a mean labour capacity of 1.5 labour units4 (Nikolitch 1969; Freeman
1985) and that the family provides at least half of the total labour input, we require (Jjfamily
farms that their total labour input does not exceed three labour units.5 Correspondingly,
4 A labour unit is defined as the t.'quivalent of the labour provided by one person in a year.
5 Hill (1993) dassifies fanns according to the balance between the amount of labour provided by the
hired work force and that contributed by the fanner and other non-hired workers. She defines the family fann
as a fann where family labour exceeds 95 percent of fann labour, irrespective of total labour input. In other
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family-managed fanns are those fanns which meet the first and second criteria but whose
labour input exceeds three labour units.
This concept of the family fann does not distinguish between full-time and part-time fanns.
For the purpose of analysing the persistence of family fanning vis-a-vis corporate fanning
part-time fanns are as relevant as full-time fanns since they represent one way in which fann
families can secure their economic survival on their fanns.
2.2.2 Objectives of Method and Materials Used
Data from the nationwide agriculture survey (Department of Statistics of New Zealand) were
used to identify the position of family fanning vis-a-vis alternative fonns of fann
organization. The data were analysed to describe the status of family fanning in terms of
number of fanns, agricultural production and distribution of land. We conjectured that
production characteristics affect the status of family fanning; hence, the analysis was carried
out for six different production systems, or so-called agricultural industries, namely the
dairy, sheep/beef, poultry, pig, crop, and horticulture industries. The objective was to
identify possible differences between the various agricultural industries.
The second objective was to find a possible trend of the status of the family fann vis-a-vis
alternative fann organizations. Since the implementation of the economic liberalisation
programme in 1984 had brought sweeping changes to the agricultural sector, the study
analyses the position of family fanning before, during and after the deregulation of the
agricultural sector. Hence, data from the agriculture surveys for 1982, 1987, and 1992 were
used.
2.2.3 Definitions of Agricultural Industry Classifications Used
Farms from the agriculture survey (Department of Statistics) were compiled into'agricultural
industries' using the New Zealand Standard Industrial Classification (NZSIC) system. The
NZSIC system classifies fanns by their predominant fanning activities and allocates five digit
codes. In this study, an 'agricultural industry' comprL<;;es all farms that derive 51 percent
or more of their gross income from the specifiedfarming activity; e.g. all fanns deriving 51
percent or more of their gross income from dairy production constitute the dairy industry.
Table 2.7 shows the definitions of agricultural industry classifications used for the analysis
of the status of family fanning.
words, there is no explicit limit to the business size of farms that fall into the group of family farms a'i in our
definition. However, a'i she points out, her definition is problematic where, a'i in New Zealand, family members
may be hired by the farm a'i workers, receiving a regular wage; consequently, such family workers are recorded
as non-family rather than as family workers.
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Table 2.7
Agricultural Industry Classification
Agricultural Industry
Dairy
Sheep/Beef
Poultry
Pig
Crop
Horticulture
NZSIC
11111, 11112, 11119
11121,11123,11124,11129,
11131, 11133, 11139
11145, 11146
11148
11161,11162,11163
11151,11171,11172,11173,
11174,11175,11176,11179
Farming Activity
The raising of cattle for their dairy
products or for breeding (including
stud).
The raising of sheep or cattle for
their products or for breeding
(including stud).
The raising of chickens and other
poultry for meat or egg production.
The breeding and raising of pigs for
meat or for sale.
The planting and harvesting of crops
(including tomatoes).
The growing of vegetables, citrus
fruit (e.g. grapefruit, lemons, and
oranges), pipfruit (e.g. apples,
pears), stonefruit (e.g. apricots,
plums), kiwifruit, berryfruit, grapes,
or other fruit not elsewhere
classified
2.2.4 Definitions of Farm Type Cla.~sificationsUsed
Fanns were grouped into 'fann types' according to their total labour input and labour
composition. Total labour input comprises all permanent labour working on the fann. The
agriculture survey distinguishes between pennanent full-time and part-time labour. Full-time
labour works 30 hours or more per week on the fann. on a continuing basis.
Correspondingly, part-time labour works less than 30 hours per week on the fann. For the
calculation of total labour input, a part-time labour unit is considered half a full-time labour
unit. Table 2.8 shows the definitions of fann type classifications used in this study.
Total labour input is composed of the three categories of pennanent workers specified in the
agriculture survey: first, working owners, leaseholders, or sharemilkers who are engaged in
the management of the fann, second, unpaid family members who assist in actual fann work,
and third, paid fann workers.
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Farm Type
Table 2.8
Farm Type Cla'isifications
Definition
Family Farm
Corporate Farm
Family-Managed Farm
Ownerl or leaseholder of the farm is part of labour input
and
total labour input ::; 3 labour units;
or
Ownerl or leaseholder of the farm is not part of labour
input but
farm is worked by unpaid family members only
and
total labour input ::; 3 labour units.
Ownerl or leaseholder of the farm is part of labour input
and
total labour input > 3 labour units;
or
Ownerl or leaseholder of the farm is not part of labour
input
but
farm is worked by unpaid family members only
and
total labour input > 3 labour units.
Ownerl or leaseholder of farm is not part of labour input
(absentee-owner)
and
farm is managed and worked by hired non-family labour
only (no unpaid family members).
Other Farm Ownerl or leaseholder of farm is not part of labour input
(absentee-owner)
and
total labour input consists of both unpaid family members
and hired non-family labour.
1 Sharemilkers with a 50/50 sharemilking agreement are also considered farm owners for they own the
herd and any plant and equipment (other than the milking plant) needed to farm the property, and therefore,
meet the 50 percent business ownership criterion required of family farms.
The agricultural survey records the number of paid farm workers at the end of February and
at the end of June, which are on most farms the peak and slack seasons respectively. Thus,
for the calculation of a farm's total labour input, the sum of paid farm workers employed at
the end of February and end of June was halved.
A shortcoming of the data from the agriculture survey is that the percentage of the farm
business owned by working owners and sharemilkers is unidentifiable; consequently, if the
data from the agriculture survey are left unadjusted, farms managed by working owners and
sharemilkers who own less than 50 percent of the farm business are included-depending on
total labour input-in farm type 'family farm' or 'family managed farm' although these farms
do not meet the 50 percent ownership criterion stipulated in the definitions of the family farm
and family-managed farm.
15
However, studies by Martin (1993) and Jones (1989) show that sharefarming agreements. and
therefore, the potential distortions are largely confined to the dairy industry. Data from
Martin's (1993) nationwide survey show that only 1.4 percent of sheep/beef farms have
sharefarming agreements of any kind. Naturally, the percentage of farms where working
owners own less than 50 percent of the farm business is even smaller. Jones (1989) found
that the sheep/beef and crop industries are virtually unaffected by sharefarming agreements.
As for horticulture, he identified the use of sharefarming agreements. Evidence cited by
Jones suggests, however, that their frequency is insignificant in horticulture. No evidence
of the frequency of sharefarming agreements could be found for the pig and poultry
industries.
Hence, for the sheep/beef, poultry, pig, crop, and horticulture industries the number of farms
with working owners owning less than the required 50 percent of the farm business to qualify
for farm type 'family farm' or 'family-managed farm' was assumed to be negligible, and the
data from the agriculture survey were, consequently, not adjusted for these industries.
To avoid a distortion in the dairy industry, the number of dairy farms with sharemilking
agreements of less than 50 percent was estimated and the data from the agriculture survey
adjusted as follows. Data from Livestock Improvement (Dairy Statistics) show that, in 1982,
1987, and 1991 (data for 1992 were not available), of all dairy farms 9.5 percent, 7.3
percent, and 7.0 percent respectively were operated by sharemilkers who owned less than 50
percent of the farm business (sharemilking agreements of 49 percent or less). In 1991, 93
percent of these farms were farms with a dairy herd of less than 300 cows. On the
assumption that farms with 300 dairy cows require three labour units (Livestock
Improvement), it was estimated that for 1991, of all dairy farms which record labour input
from the first category of labour-the working owner, leaseholder, or sharemilker-in fact
6.5 percent (93% of 7.0%) and 0.5 percent (7% of 7.0%) do not qualify for farm type
'family farm' and 'family-managed farm' respectively. These farms do not meet the 50
percent ownership criterion required of family farms and family-managed farms, and
therefore, are included in farm type 'corporate farm'. 1982 and 1987 survey data were
corrected by 8.8% points and 6.8% points for farm type 'family farm' and 0.7% points and
0.5% points for farm type 'family-managed farms' respectively.6
2.2.5 Analysis of the Use of Temporary Labour
It should be noted that casual and contract labour, that is, labour engaged on farms for
seasonal and other temporary work such as fruit and produce picking, fencing, shearing, etc.,
is not included in the total labour input of family farms. The omission of casual and contract
labour from the labour input of farms may distort the picture of the actual labour requirement
of farms, and therefore the strength of family farming, for a considerable part of farmwork
may be done by casual and contract labour. However, a conversion of temporary labour into
full-time labour equivalents, as Nakano (1979) suggests, would be arbitrary in our case
because the agriculture survey provides information neither on the duration of casual and
contract employment, nor on wage expenditure for temporary labour. Hence, casual and
contract labour input was analysed separately in order to get a notion of the proportions of
seasonal and other temporary labour as compared to permanent farm labour in the various
6 Thus, the percentage of sharemilkers with a sharemilking agreement of less than 50 percent operating
farms with no more than three labour units was assumed to be the same in 1982 and 1987 as in 1991.
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industries.
With regard to contract labour, data were only available for 1987 and 1992. Moreover, the
agriculture survey provides information on the number of persons engaged in the various
agricultural services but not on the use of these services by the various agricultural
industries. Hence, agricultural contract services were allocated to agricultural industries as
shown in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9
Allocation of Agricultural Services to Agricultural Industries
Agricultural Service
Scrub Cutting
Fencing
Shearing Services
Livestock Contracting Services
Crop Cultivation Services
Crop Harvesting
Aviation Topdressing
Groundspread Topdressing
Aviation Spraying
Groundspread Spraying
Other Agricultural Contracting
NZSIC
11211
11212
11222
11229
11231
11232
11241
11242
11243
11244
11259
Agricultural Industry
Sheep/Beef
Sheep/Beef
Sheep/Beef
Dairy, Sheep/Beef
Crop, Horticulture
Dairy, Sheep/Beef, Crop, Horticulture
Sheep/Beef
Dairy, Sheep/Beef
Crop, Horticulture
Crop, Horticulture
Dairy. Sheep/Beef, Poultry. Pig, Crop,
Horticulture
2.2.6 Surveyed Farms
The agriculture survey also records farms with zero labour input. In this analysis all these
farms were excluded. Table 2.10 shows the total number of farms analysed and the relative
frequency of farmsfor each agricultural industry in 1982,1987, and 1992. We note that the
dairy and sheep/beef industries are clearly the dominant industries while the poultry, pig, and
crop industries are only minor industries.
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Table 2.10
Total Number and Percentage of Farms by Agricultural Industry
1982 1987 1992
Agricultural No. of as % No. of as% No. of as %
Industry Farms of Total Farms of Total Farms of Total
Dairy 15,350 25.5 14,644 27.8 15,057 30.2
Sheep/Beef 36,480 60.6 29,186 55.3 26,079 52.2
Poultry 435 0.7 363 0.7 301 0.6
Pig 646 1.1 422 0.8 604 1.2
Crop 2,181 3.6 1,552 2.9 1,194 2.4
Horticulture 5,139 8.5 6,592 12.5 6,674 13.4
All Farms 60,231 100.0 52,759 100.0 48,626 100.0
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
2.2.7 Concept and Calculation of E."timated Value of Agricultural Operations
The Estimated Value of Agricultural Operations (EVAO) is used forthe comparative analysis
of production of the various farm types. The EVAO concept calculates the value of output
for each farm. For each individual farming activity of a farm (e.g. sheep farming, beef
farming, growing fruit etc.) the Department of Statistics calculates an individual EVAO
(EVAO variable). The total of all EVAO variables comprises the EVAO for a farm. For
the calculation of the EVAO for an individual farm, the Department of Statistics uses average
rather than actual livestock prices and production per hectare because the Agriculture Survey
questionnaire does not provide specific information on livestock prices and production rates
per hectare. On this basis output figures have to be treated with some caution.
The Department of Statistics has been calculating EVAOs from 1986 onwards; hence, a
comparative analysis of production of the various farm types was possible for 1987 and 1992
but not for 1982.
2.2.8 Calculation of Output Coefficient, Land Concentration Coefficient,
and Land Productivity Coefficient
The output coefficient, land concentration coefficient, and land productivity coefficient of
each farm type were calculated for the various agricultural industries. The output coefficient
expresses the percentage contribution to the total value of output in an industry of one
percent of the fanns in that industJy; in other words, it indicates whether a specified farm
type contributes a higher or lower share to the total output value of the industry than the
percentage this farm type comprises of all farms in that industry. It has to be noted that the
total value of output in an industry, say the dairy industry, is the sum of the values of all
commodities produced in that industry; besides their main commodity milk, dairy farms may
also be involved in the sheep/beef, poultry/egg, pigmeat, crop, and horticulture production.
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The land concentration coefficient expresses the percentage ofland farmed in an indu..<;;try by
one percent of the farms; hence, this coefficient indicates whether a specified farm type
controls a higher or lower share of total farmland in the industry than the percentage this
fann type comprises of all farms in that industry.
The land productivity coefficient expresses the percentage contribution to the total value of
output in an industry of one percent of the farmland. The coefficient shows whether the
allocation of 1 percent of farmland to a particular fann type in an industry contributes more
or less than 1 percent to the total value of output in the respective industry. A coefficient
of more than 1.0 means that farms of that particular farm type have a higher output per
hectare than the industry average. Since the Department of Statistics estimates the
agricultural output of crop and horticulture farms by multiplying the fanned hectares by an
average rather than the actual output per hectare, it would have been meaningless to calculate
the land productivity coefficients for the crop and horticulture industries. In the case of the
poultry and pig industry, the interpretation of land productivity coefficients is questionable
because fanns in these industries are not pastoral production systems like dairy and
sheep/beef fanns; in other words, poultry and pig farms may buy in all the necessary animal
feed rather than grow it. Hence, land productivity coefficients were only calculated for the
dairy and sheep/beef industries. For these industries the land productivity coefficients
provide useful information on the output per hectare of farms of the various farm types, and
therefore, the stocking rate per hectare of the various farm types. Production data (EVAO)
were not available for 1982; hence, land productivity coefficients could be calculated for
1987 and 1992 but not for 1982.
2.3 Results
The position of family farming is described before, during and after deregulation (1982, 1987
and 1992) for the dairy, sheep/beef, poultry, pig, crop, and horticulture industries. The
relative importance of family farms vis-a-vis other types of farms is shown as a percentage
of all fanns, agricultural production and distribution of land. The results are interpreted with
regard to longitudinal changes and cross-sectional differences. Finally, our results are
compared with those of previous studies conducted in New Zealand and other parts of the
world.
2.3.1 Family Farms a.., a Percentage of AIl Farms
In tenns of the number of farms, farm type 'family farm' dominated in all agricultural
industries in 1982, 1987 and 1992, that is before, during and after the deregulation of
agriculture. Table 2.11 shows the relative frequency of the four farm types for each
agricultural industry and for all surveyed farms for 1982, 1987 and 1992.
In all industries, the ranking of the four farm types by their relative frequency was identical.
'Family farm' and 'other farm' were the most and the least frequent farm types respectively,
while 'family-managed farms' were more frequent than 'corporate farms'. 7 In 1982 and
1992 'family farms' comprised over 80 percent of all the farms. With one exception, the
7 To remind the reader, the 'family farm' and the 'family-managed farm' only differ in size. Labour
input of 'family farms' does not exceed three labour units; 'family-managed farms' have a labour input of more
than three labour units.
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poultry industry, the percentage of family farms exceeded 70 percent in all agricultural
industries; the share of family farms was highest in the sheep/beef and cropping industries
with over 80 percent. Only in the dairy and poultry industries corporate farms ever
comprised more than 10 percent of all farms. The relative frequency of family-managed
farms varied considerably between agricultural industries; while the percentage of family-
managed farms ranged from 6 percent to 8.5 percent in the sheep/beef industry, this farm
type comprised between 28.5 percent and 32.5 percent of the farms in the poultry industry.
Farm type 'other farm' never comprised more than 1.7 percent of all farms in any of the six
industries. Due to its insignificance, we ignore this farm type in the further discussion.
Table 2.11
Percentage of Farms by Farm Type and Agricultural Industry
Agricultural Family- Corporate
Industry.' Year Family Farms Managed Farms Farms Other Farms
Dairy 1982 71.26 17.46 10.92 0.36
1987 n.53 15.82 9.98 0.66
1992 75.48 14.14 9.81 0.56
Sheep/Beef 1982 85.85 8.46 5.07 0.63
1987 83.54 8.23 7.20 1.03
1992 87.39 6.01 5.73 0.86
Poultry 1982 62.30 28.51 8.97 0.23
1987 53.72 32.51 12.40 1.38
1992 56.81 28.57 12.96 1.66
Pig 1982 82.51 13.16 3.87 0.46
1987 72.99 19.19 7.35 0.47
1992 80.96 13.91 4.47 0.66
Crop 1982 88.26 8.44 2.66 0.64
1987 84.15 9.92 4.70 1.22
1992 84.76 10.80 3.18 1.26
Horticulture 1982 79.59 14.91 4.85 0.66
1987 72.66 17.07 8.86 1.41
1992 76.84 13.78 8.15 1.23
All Industries 1982 81.48 11.49 6.47 0.56
1987 79.13 11.75 8.14 0.98
1992 82.06 9.85 7.25 0.83
Source: Department of Statistics. Agriculture Survey
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Between 1982 and 1987 the share of corporate fanns rose moderately in all but the dairy
industry. The opposite was true for fann type 'family fann'; its share decreased between
1982 and 1987 except in the dairy industry where it rose by 2.3% points. A marked decline
in the percentage of family fanns was experienced in the poultry, pig and horticulture
industries in this period; in these industries the percentage of family fanns dropped by almost
9% points, 10% points, and 7% points respectively. The decline of family fanning was less
pronounced in the sheep/beef (2.5% points) and crop industries (4% points).
Both trends, the expansion of corporate fanning and the decline of family fanning, came to
a halt in the following five year period. In fact, between 1987 and 1992, the share of
corporate fanning declined in all industries but the poultry industry, while family farming
strengthened its position in all industries. The percentages of family fanns in the dairy and
sheep/beef industries reached levels in 1992 that exceeded those prior to agricultural
deregulation (1982) by 4.2% points and 1.5% points respectively. In the poultry, pig, crop,
and horticulture industries the strengthening of the position of family fanning between 1987
and 1992 did not compensate for the decline experienced in the previous five years; family
farming in these industries reached levels which were 5.5% points, 1.5% points, 3.5%
points, and 2.7% points lower respectively than those in 1982. At the same time, the share
of corporate fanning was higher than before deregulation in all industries except the dairy
industry where it was 1.1% points lower; while the increase in corporate fanning was less
than 1% point in the sheep/beef, pig, and crop industries, it was 4% points in the poultry and
3.3% points in the horticulture industry.
A comparison of agricultural industries shows that, in 1992 as in 1982, the dairy and poultry
industries had the two highest while the pig and crop industries had the two lowest
percentages of corporate fanning of all the industries. Ranked by the relative frequency of
family fanning, the sheep/beef and crop industries had the two highest while the dairy and
poultry industries had the two lowest percentages of family fanns in both years.
Between 1982 and 1987 the share of family-managed fanns decreased in the dairy and
sheep/beef industries while it rose in the remaining industries. However, in the following
five year period, the relative frequency of this fann type decreased in all industries. Hence,
in 1992, the percentage of family-managed fanns in the dairy, sheep/beef and horticulture
industries was respectively 3.3% points, 2.4% points, and 1.2% points lower than in 1982;
during the same period, the share of family-managed fanns remained unchanged in the
poultry industry and rose 0.6% points and 2.4% points in the pig and crop industries
respectively.
In 1992 as in 1982, the poultry and dairy industries had the highest and second highest
percentages of family-managed fanns while the crop and sheep/beef industries had the two
lowest; family-managed fanns comprised over 28 percent of all fanns in the poultry industry
in 1992 as in 1982 but only 8 percent and 6 percent in the sheep/beef industry in those years.
In sum, notwithstanding the absence of government support, our results show that in all
agricultural industries the family fann was the most frequent type of fann in 1982, 1987 and
1992, that is before, during and after the deregulation of agriculture, and that family-
managed fanns were more frequent than corporate fanns. In the poultry, pig, crop, and
horticulture industries the position of family fanning was weaker after deregulation than
before with regard to the relative frequency of this fann type. However, in the dairy and
sheep/beef industries-the two main agricultural industries that comprise over 80 percent of
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all fanns-the posItIOn of family fanning vis-a-vis alternative organizational fonns was
stronger after eight years of fanning without state support than prior to deregulation.
The Incidence ofPart-time Family Fanning
As the definition of the 'family fann' shows, family fanns may be fanns whose labour input
consists solely of unpaid family members, i.e. the fann owner is not part of fann labour.
We call these fanns part-time family farms. Table 2.12 shows the percentages of this type
of family fann. The relative frequencies of part-time family fanns rose in all agricultural
industries between 1982 and 1987. This development was particularly pronounced in
sheep/beef and pig fanning where the relative frequency ofpart-time family fanns increased
by almost 9% points and in 1987 reached levels of more than 10 percent. In the following
five year period however, this trend was reversed except in the pig and horticulture industries
where the increase continued at a more moderate rate than during the preceding five years.
In 1992, the percentage of part-time family fanns was in all industries higher than in 1982.
While in 1982 part-time family fanns did not exceed 3 percent in any of the industries, in
1992 this type of family fann accounted for less than 8 percent only in the dairy and poultry
industries. In tenns of labour input, most part-time family fanns were relatively small
fanns. While 75 percent of the dairy and horticulture part-time family fanns in 1992 had
a labour input that did not exceed 1.5 labour units, of the sheep/beef, pig, and crop part-time
family fanns 80 percent did not exceed this mark; in the poultry industry none of the part-
time family fanns had a labour input of more than one labour unit.
Table 2.12
Percentage of Family Farms with Unpaid Family Labour Only
Agricultural Industry
Year Dair.y Sheep/Beef Poultr.y Pig Crop Horticulture
1982 0.51 1.97 1.48 2.44 1.92 2.10
1987 3.33 10.45 4.10 11.04 8;65 7.72
1992 3.15 9.59 2.34 13.09 8.20 9.71
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
In sum, our results' show that after deregulation, the relative frequency ofpart-time family
fann.<>, that isfamilyfanns that are \Forked by unpaidfamity members only, increased sharply
in all industries. Hence, the removal (?f:.;tate support induced many farmers to s'eek off-Jarm
employment in order to secure theirfarm husines$'.
11,e Significance of Temporar.y Labour
Family fanns may also employ seasonal and other temporary labour, that is casual and
contract labour. Table 2.13 illustrates the average casual labour input per family fann for
each agricultural industry during the peak (February) and slack (June) seasons in the
production process as well as the yearly average of casual input. As the figures illustrate,
the use of casual labour by family fanns varied considerably between industries as well as
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between the busy and slack seasons. While horticulture farms clearly had the highest casual
labour input, both during peak and slack periods, pig farms had the lowest. On average
throughout the year, dairy, sheep/beef, pig, and crop farms employed less than 0.2 casual
labour units. In the horticulture industries, the average yearly casual labour input ranged
from 0.68 to 1.07 labour units.
Table 2.13
Average Number of Ca.~ual Labour Unit~ Employed by Family Farms
February June Yearly Average
Agr. Industty 1982 1987 1992 1982 1987 1992 1982 1987 1992
Dairy 0.16 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.09
Sheep/Beef 0.21 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.14 0.11 0.08
Poultry 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.10 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.22 0.31
Pig 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.07
Crop 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.12 0.11
Horticulture 1.43 1.32 0.92 0.43 0.81 0.43 0.93 1.07 0.68
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
Table 2.14 shows the average number of contract labour units employed by family farms in
the various agricultural industries for 1987 and 1992. The figures show that family farms
in the sheep/beef, crop, and horticulture industries employed relatively more contract labour
than dairy, poultry, and pig family farms, where the use of contract labour was negligible
both in 1987 and in 1992.
Hence, Tables 2.13 and 2.14 suggest that temporary labour, that is the sum of casual and
contract labour, varied between the various agricultural industries. While horticulture farms
on average used 0.76 temporary labour units in 1992, the dairy, sheep/beef, poultry, pig, and
crop farms used 0.15, 0.31, 0.32, 0.08, and 0.23 temporary labour units respectively.
Our results show that horticulture family farms used less and sheep/beef, pig, and crop farms
almost the same amount of temporary labour in 1992 as compared to 1987; only dairy and
poultry farms increased their input of temporary labour during that period.
Table 2.14
Average Number of Contract Labour Unit~ Employed per Family Farm
Agricultural Industr.J'
Year Dairy Sheep/Beef Poultr.y Pig Crop Horticulture
1987 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.11
1992 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.01 0.12 0.08
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
23
In sum, the use of temporary labour varies considerably between agricultural industries.
Horticulture farms use relatively more temporary labour than farms of all other industries
and pig farms have the lowest input of temporary labour. Hence, using a definition of 'the
family farm' which includes temporary labour in the labour criterion, in contrast to our
definition of family farms, would show family farming-particularly in the horticulture
industry-to be less prevalent than our results.
2.3.2 The Rel.ative Importance of Family Farm Production
Table 2.15 shows the total production of the various commodities, and the relative
importance of the four farm types in terms of their contribution to the total output of each
commodity. The sheep/beef and dairy output together comprised 75 percent in 1987 and 79
percent in 1992 of the total value of production. At the other end of the scale, the
production of pigmeat contributed less than 2 percent to the total value of production. The
figures show that in 1987 family farms produced more than half of the total dairy,
sheep/beef, and crof output but less than 50 percent of the poultry and egg, pigmeat and
horticulture output. In 1992, family farms accounted for less than 50 percent of the total
output only for the poultry/egg and horticulture commodities. The percentage of output
produced by family farms rose between 1987 and 1992-although moderately-for all
commodities except for crop and horticulture products where family farms produced
respectively 2% points and 5% points less of total output than in 1987.
In 1987 as in 1992 corporate farms accounted for less than 18 percent of the total production
of any of the six commodities. In crop production corporate farms held less than 8 percent
of output in both years, while their percentage contribution to the sheep/beef output was over
17 percent in 1987 and slightly less than 16 percent in 1992.
Family-managed farms produced more than corporate farms of all the commodities. In
poultry and egg production, the percentage produced by family-managed farms even
exceeded that of family farms. Between 1987 and 1992, the contribution of family-managed
farms to total dairy output was static; during the same period, their share of the sheep/beef
and poultry/egg output decreased while their percentage of the pigmeat, crop, and
horticulture production increased by 2% points to 3% points. 'Other farms' produced less
than 2 percent of any commodity in both years of observation.
8 It is important to note that the contribution of a particular farm type, say family farms, to the
production of a commodity, say sheep/beef, is the sum of the sheep/beef output of family farms in the dairy,
sheep/beef, crop, poultry, pig, and horticulture industries. This is because-according to the definitions of the
agricultural industry classifications used-farms of each agricultural industry may derive up to 49 percent of
their gross income from the production of other commodities than the one specified in the definition of the
agricultural industry the farm belongs to. Hence, table 2.15 does not show the share of a commodity, e.g.
sheep/beef, that is produced by sheep/beef family farms; it shows the share of the total sheep/beef output that
is produced by all family farms.
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Table 2.15
Agricultural Output by Farm Type and Commodity
Farm T)pe
Fami£r Family- Corporate Other Total
Commodity Year Farms Managed Farms Farms Farms Value oj Output
------------------------ (in Percent) ---------------------- (Million NZ$)
Dairy 1987 64.71 23.83 10.60 0.86 1,077
1992 65.18 23.40 10.82 0.60 2,010
Sheep/Beef 1987 62.13 18.83 17.59 1.45 2,083
1992 66.45 16.60 15.75 1.20 2,268
Poultry/Egg 1987 39.44 43.91 15.13 1.52 111
1992 41.77 40.69 16.28 1.27 112
Pigmeat 1987 49.30 32.85 17.18 0.67 71
1992 51.54 35.16 12.45 0.86 89
Crop 1987 70.70 20.50 7.25 1.56 178
1992 68.53 23.53 6.37 1.57 153
Horticulture 1987 48.39 35.99 14.04 1.57 663
1992 43.44 37.99 16.61 1.96 774
Note: Data for 1982 were not available.
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
In all industries, farm type 'corporate farm' and farm type 'family-managed farm'
contributed a higher share to the total output value of the industry than the percentages these
farm types comprised of all farms in that industry, while farm type 'family farm' contributed
a lower share. This is illustrated in Table 2.16. It shows the output coefficients of each
farm type in the various industries. The output coefficient expresses the percentage
contribution to the total value of output in an industry of one percent of the farms in that
industry. 9 While the output coefficients of farm type 'family farm' were less than 1.0, those
of family-managed farms and corporate farms exceeded 1.0 in all industries. lO The gap
between the percentage which a farm type contribute to the output in the industry and the
percentage it comprised of all the farms in the industry was particularly pronounced for pig
9 To remind the reader, the total value of output in an industry, say the dairy industry, is the sum
of the values of all commodities produced in that industry; besides dairy products, dairy farms may be involved
in the sheep/beef, poultry/egg, pigmeat, crop, and horticulture production.
10 The figures may be interpreted in the sense, that family farms are smaller on average than family-
managed farms and corporate farms in terms of output value. On the assumption that labour input correlates
with the value of farm output, this conclusion is legitimate with regard to the comparison of family with family-
managed farms since the latter are larger than family farms in terms of labour input by definition. However,
the lack of standard deviations precludes the conclusion that the mean output value of corporate farms differs
s(r;nificant(l' from that of family farms.
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and horticulture family farms, family-managed sheep/beef, pig, crop and horticulture farms,
and corporate sheep/beef and pig farms.
Table 2.16
Output Coefficient~ of Each Farm Type
Agricultural Fami£v- Corporate
Industry Year Fami£v Farms Managed Farms Farms Other Farms
Dairy 1987 0.88 1.52 1.06 1.27
1992 0.86 1.62 1.11 1.09
Sheep/Beef 1987 0.75 2.26 2.43 1.43
1992 0.77 2.63 2.82 1.37
Poultry 1987 0.73 1.36 1.22 1.10
1992 0.74 1.42 1.26 0.76
Pig 1987 0.59 1.90 2.74 0.94
1992 0.60 2.75 2.64 1.44
Crop 1987 0.84 2.05 1.48 1.49
1992 0.82 2.32 1.33 1.17
Horticulture 1987 0.65 2.18 1.62 1.08
1992 0.56 2.74 2.07 1.65
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
Between 1987 and 1992, the coefficients of family farms changed no more than± 0.1 points
in any of the industries; those of family-managed sheep/beef, pig, crop, and horticulture
farms and of corporate sheep/beef and horticulture farms increased more than 0.1 points.
Hence, the importance ofindividual family farms in terms of their contribution to agricultural
output remained almost constant.
In sum, family farming is not only dominant in terms offarm numbers but also in terms of
its contribution to agricultural output. Family farms produced the greater part of all the
major agricultural commodities in 1987 and 1992. Only of the poultry/egg and horticulture
output family farms produced less than 50 percent. That family farming is not yet moribund
is supported by the fact that the share ofproduction contributed by family farms increased
rather than decreased between 1987 and 1992.
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2.3.3 The Relative Importance of Family Farming in Terms of Farmed Land
Table 2.17 illustrates the percentage of land which is farmed by the four farm types. In 1982
and 1987, family farms controlled more than half of all the farmland in the various
industries, except in the poultry industry. In 1992, the percentage of land held by family
farms exceeded 50 percent in all industries. In aggregate, family-managed farms farmed
more land than corporate farms in all industries. Again, in all industries 'other farms' played
an insignificant role; their share of all the farmland in the industry exceeded 2 percent only
in the horticulture industry in 1992.
Table 2.17
Percentage of Farmland Controlled by the Various Farm Types
Agricultural Fami£v- Corporate
Industry Year Fami(v Farms Managed Farms Farms Other Farms
Dairy 1982 63.59 24.81 11.19 0.41
1987 65.58 23.19 10.50 0.73
1992 64.07 24.26 10.87 0.80
Sheep/Beef 1982 55.99 25.00 18.26 0.75
1987 53.61 25.38 19.41 1.60
1992 58.06 22.55 18.31 1.08
Poultry 1982 35.29 46.16 18.54 0.01
1987 33.91 48.18 17.56 0.35
1992 51.08 27.56 20.19 1.17
Pig 1982 62.27 25.55 11.17 1.01
1987 56.62 29.63 13.63 0.12
1992 65.73 28.63 4.10 1.54
Crop 1982 74.40 20.09 4.18 1.33
1987 70.94 20.94 6.69 1.43
1992 71.98 22.60 3.90 1.52
Horticulture 1982 57.99 29.63 11.55 0.83
1987 50.65 33.86 14.40 1'()9
1992 54.06 27.84 15.61 2.49
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
Except in the dairy industry, the percentage of farmland held by family farms decreased
between 1982 and 1987, while family-managed farms increased their share of the farmed
land. Corporate farms increased their share in all but the dairy and poultry industry during
the same period. The largest changes occurred in horticulture where family farms lost 7.3%
points while family-managed farms and corporate farms gained 4.2% points and 2.9% points
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respectively. Between 1987 and 1992, the opposite happened: where a farm type had gained
between 1982 and 1987 it lost, and where its percentage of farmland had increased it
decreased. The only exceptions were family- managed crop farms and corporate farms in
horticulture whose share increased in both periods.
Hence, in 1992 family farms controlled a higher percentage of farmland than in 1982 in the
dairy, sheep/beef, poultry and pig industries; in cropping and horticulture their share was
respectively 2.5% points and 3.9% points lower than in 1982. Family-managed farms
comprised a higher percentage of land in 1992 than in 1982 only in the pig and crop
industries. For corporate farms the same was the case in the poultry and horticulture
industries.
In sum, our results show that family farming is not only dominant in terms of number of
farms and agricultural output but also in terms of the farmed land. Eight years after
deregulation, family farms held over 50 percent of the farmland in all industries. Indeed,
family farms controlled a higherpercentage offarmland after deregulation than before except
in the crop and horticulture industries, which together comprised less than 3 percent ofall
the farmland.
Land Concentration Coefficient
The land concentration coefficient expresses the percentage of land farmed in an industry by
one percent of the farms. II Overall family farms had a land concentration coefficient of
less than 1.0; hence, the percentage of land controlled by family farms was lower than the
percentage this farm type comprised of all the farms in the individual industries. In the case
of family-managed farms and corporate farms the coefficient was less than 1.0 only for
family-managed poultry farms and corporate pig farms in 1992. Thus, with those exceptions,
family-managed farms and corporate farms controlled a higher percentage of land than the
share of farms these farm types comprised of all the farms in the respective industries; in
other words, family farms farmed a smaller while family-managed and corporate farms
produced on a larger area than 'the average farm' in the industry.
Land Productivity Coefficient
The land productivity coefficient expresses the percentage contribution to the total value of
output in an industry of one percent of the farmland. The coefficient shows whether the
allocation of 1 percent of farmland to a particular farm type in an industry contributes more
or less than 1 percent to the total value of output in the respective industry. A coefficient
of more than 1.0 means that farms of that particular farm type have a higher output per
hectare than the industry average. 12 Hence, Table 2.18 shows the land productivity
1 1 The land concentration coefficients are derived by dividing the figures in Table 2.17 by the
respective figures in Table 2.11.
12 To remind the reader, the Department of Statistics estimates the agricultural output of crop and
horticulture farms by multiplying the farmed hectares by an average rather than the actual output per hectare;
hence, the calculation of the land productivity coefficients for the crop and horticulture industries would have
been meaningless. In the case of the poultry and pig industry, the interpretation of land productivity coefficients
would have been questionable because farms in these industries are not pastoral production systems like dairy
and sheep/beef farms; in other words, poultry and pig farms may buy in all the necessary animal feed rather
than grow it.
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coefficients of the four farm types for the dairy and sheep/beef industries In 1987 and
1992. 13
As the figures show, land intensity in the dairy industry differed very little between family
farms, family-managed farms and corporate farms. In the sheep/beef industry, however,
family farms as a group farmed their land more intensively than family-managed farms and
corporate farms; in other words, non-family farms tend to have a lower productivity per
hectare, and therefore, a lower stocking rate per hectare than family farms. 14,15
Comparing the coefficients in 1992 with those in 1987, we note that in both industries they
stayed almost constant for family, family-managed, and corporate farms. This suggests that
dairy and sheep/beef farms have not changed their stocking rates per hectare between 1987
and 1992.
Table 2.18
Land Producthity Coefficient., of Each Farm Type
Agricultural Fami£v- Corporate
Industry Year Fami£v Farms Managed Farms Farms Other Farms
Dairy 1987 0.99 1.04 1.00 1.15
1992 l.(n 0.97 1.00 0.77
Sheep/Beef 1987 1.16 0.73 0.90 0.92
1992 1.15 0.70 0.88 1.10
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
17ze Importance ofLand as a Production Factor
In the case of sheep/beef farms the land productivity coefficients of sheep/beef farms suggest
that the productivity per hectare of family farms is higher than that of corporate farms. At
the same time, the output coefficients showed for the sheep/beef industry that corporate farms
produced a higher than average output per farm-they contributed a higher percentage to
13 Since production data (EVAO) were not available for 1982, land productivity coefficients could not
be calculated for 1982.
14 The correlation between production per hectare and stock units per hectare is one in this case
because the Department of Statistics calculates the output value of livestock farms on the basis of the number
of stock units on farms. Stock unit is a measure for livestock numbers in terms of breeding ewe equivalents;
it places different livestock animals on a comparative basis.
15 Since the Department of Statistics uses average rather than actual stock values for the calculation
of the output value of livestock farms, one may suspect that the actual stock performance, and therefore the
actual value of stock to be higher (lower) than average for farms with relatively low (high) stocking rates. As
a result the land productivity of those farms would be higher (lower) than our results show. However, this
distortion is conceivable not only for farms with relatively high or low output per hectare, but would have to
be expected across all farms. Hence, the land productivity coefficient of a farm type, a class average, is
expected to be undistorted.
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agricultural output than the percentage they comprised of all the farms in the industry.
Moreover, the land concentration coefficients for the sheep/beef industry showed that
corporate farms are larger in area than the average farm. Indeed, the average farm size of
corporate sheep/beef farms in terms of hectares was significantly larger than that of family
sheep/beef farms. While the average farm area of family farms was 243 hectares in 1982,
262 hectares in 1987, and 267 hectares in 1992, corporate farms averaged 1,341 hectares,
1,100 hectares, and 1,284 hectares in the respective years. These results suggest that
corporate sheep/beeffarms tend to be both less heavily stocked per hectare and larger in
terms offarmed area.
Furthermore, the amount of land used as a production factor may differ greatly between
agricultural industries. Table 2.19 illustrates that land as a production factor is not equally
important for all industries. The figures show first, that the average area per farm grew in
all industries between 1982 and 1992, second, that farms in the sheep/beef industry were
significantly larger in terms of hectares than farms in all other industries, third, that the
landbase of poultry, pig, and horticulture farms was significantly smaller than the average
area used by dairy, sheep/beef, and crop farms, and finally, that the value of output per
hectare produced by poultry, pig, and horticulture farms is significantly higher than for
dairy, sheep/beef, and crop farms.
Table 2.19
Area per Farm and Value of Output per Hectare by Agricultural Industry
Agricultural Industry
Year Dairy Sheep/Beef Poultry Pig Crop Horticulture
-----------------------------------------(lIectares) -----------------------------------------.
1982
1987
1992
87
89
102
372
408
402
16
16
23
27
44
48
96
139
161
17
18
26
------------~---------------- (Value of Output per lIectare in NZ$) --------------------
1992 1,363 207 16,989 3,169 671 4,554
Source: Department of Statistics, Agriculture Survey
2.3.4 A Comparison ,"ith Pre,ious Studies
When we compare our results with those of other studies we should note that the various
studies, first, apply different concepts of 'the family farm', second, use different agricultural
industry classifications, and third, analyse agricultures which differ in terms of their
agricultural policies.
Several studies analysed the position of family farming, or conversely, that of non-family
farming in the United States. Using a similar definition to ours in terms of labour input,
Nikolitch (1969) analyses the relative importance of family farming in United States
agriculture between 1949 and 1964. He shows that despite a marked reduction in the number
of farms, family farms dominate in terms of the number of farms and their share of the
30
output both in 1949 and 1964. In 1964, family farms accounted for 95 percent of all farms
and for 64 percent of the value of all products sold. However, Nikolitch does not
differentiate between agricultural industries; instead he shows the proportions of family
farming and its share of output by states. Regional differences are partly related to
differences in the composition of the agricultural sector in the various regions. He concludes
that farms producing vegetables, fruits, eggs, and fed cattle tend to develop into non-family
farms.
Krause and Kyle (1970) and Nakano (1979) observe in their studies of the incidence of large-
scale farming in the United States that labour input per farm and the concentration of
production are not uniform by agricultural industry. Nakano (1979) also shows that in the
horticulture industry farms use a large number of seasonal workers, while those farms
engaged in cropping, poultry, dairy, and livestock ranches use relatively less temporary
labour. Both studies show that horticulture farms, poultry farms, and livestock ranches16
have a higher concentration of production (that is fewer farms control a higher share of total
production) than other production systems such as livestock, cropping, and dairy farms.
Tweeten (1984) found that in the United States agriculture farms hiring less than half of their
labour account for 95 percent of all farms and 53 percent of all production and that large
corporate farms are prominent among horticulture farms and in the production of cattle and
calves. Reinhardt and Barlett (1989) maintain that corporate structures in the United States
have expanded rapidly in poultry production and large feedlot operations, but have declined
in pastoral production of livestock.
These results coincide with our findings, insofar as we also found that non-family farms
dominate the production of horticultural commodities, poultry and eggs. Like Nakano
(1979) ,we also observed that horticulture farms use relatively more seasonal labour than
farms in other industries.
With regard to livestock farms, livestock ranches, and feedlot operations, a comparison of
results is problematic due to differences in the classifications of agricultural industries.
Nikolitch (1969) and Reinhardt and Barlett (1989) suggest that the presence of non-family
organizations is strong in the case of feedlots, that is operations that fatten livestock with
grain. Krause and Kyle (1970) and Nakano (1979) observe a high presence of non-family
organizations for livestock ranches, that is extensive pastoral farms. However, Reinhardt and
Barlett (1989) argue that corporate farming in pastoral production of livestock has decreased.
In our analysis we differentiated neither between cow/calf farms and mixed sheep/cattle
farms nor between intensive and extensive livestock production systems. Conclusions
concerning the organizational form of feedlot operations in New Zealand are not possible
since only one such beef fattening operation-a corporate farm-existed in New Zealand at
the time of the study. However, our results show that the degree of corporate farming was
low in the sheep/beef industry; since sheep/beef farms in New Zealand are pastoral
production systems, we conclude, consistent with Reinhardt and Barlett (1989), that pastoral
livestock production is not dominated by corporate farms. Our analysis showed also that
corporate sheep/beef farms farmed a significantly larger area than the average farm in the
industry. At the same time we observed that the production per hectare ratio of corporate
sheep/beef farms was lower than the industry average. Hence, the presence of corporate
16 A ranch is an extensive pastoral livestock operation in the North American context.
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farms was stronger in extensive, low stocking rate per hectare livestock production than in
intensive pastoral livestock breeding and fattening.
Fairweather (1992) studies the agrarian restructuring in New Zealand after deregulation.
Using aggregated farm labour data for the identification of changes in farm employment
between 1984 and 1990 he identifies an increase in family labour and a decrease in paid
labour. Schmitt (1991) has observed a similar change in other countries. Hill (1993)
interprets this trend as a sign that "[a]griculture, as an industry, is clearly becoming more
family dominated in terms of labour input" (p. 360).
In her study, Hill (1993) analyses the importance of family farming within the European
Community in terms of number of farms and contribution to output. She defines family
farms as farms where family labour exceeds 95 percent, and-unlike our definition-does not
place a limit on the business size of family farms. She observes that the shares represented
by family farms varied between Member States. Of the 12 Member States in 1989, family
farms comprised less than 50 percent of all the farms only in the U.K. and Portugal. Hill's
study has the same shortcoming as Nikolitch's (1969): it does not differentiate between
agricultural industries. Like Nikolitch, she assumes that differences in the importance of
family farming between Member States are the result of differences in the composition of the
various agricultural sectors.
Consistent with what we observed in New Zealand agriculture, her study shows that family
farms domir.ate farm numbers across the European Community; their importance is reduced,
however, when their contribution to total agricultural output is examined. Hill interprets this
as a sign that a link exists between family farms and small size. This link was confirmed
in our analysis by the relatively low output coefficients of family farms.
Cloke (1989) argues that in New Zealand there is a trend in outside capital showing
increasing interest in agriculture. However, our analysis showed that corporate farming
expanded between 1982 and 1987 and decreased in the following five years. Similarly,
Fairweather (1992) shows that business person buyers, who typically do not purchase farms
to manage the property personally, bought nearly 20 percent of the farms that were sold in
1981; this percentage decreased to 15 percent in 1985, but then increased again to reach the
highest level of 23 percent by 1987. Since then, it has declined to the lowest level of 7
percent in 1991. Hence, a clear trend concerning outside investors' interest in agriculture
has not emerged between 1982 and 1992; business purchasers were active for a short period
after 1984 when farmland prices were depressed due largely to the abolition of government
support to agriculture, but then retreated from the farmland market as land prices recovered.
Fairweather (1992) shows that business investment in farming has been more likely in some
agricultural industries than others. He observes that of all the horticulture and grazing farms
sold on the open market between 1982 and 1991, farm purchases by business buyers
comprised on average 23 percent and 18 percent respectively. At the bottom end of the scale
were dairy (10%), crop (11%), and livestock fattening (12%). Similarly, we observed a
greater increase in corporate farming in the horticulture industry than in dairy, sheep/beef,
and crop industries. However, Fairweather's results do not reflect the degree of corporate
farming in all industries as we have defined it; in dairying, for instance, business buyers
purchase dairy farms which sharemilkers operate for them. Where sharemilkers own 50
percent of the farm business, these farms are defined here as family farms rather than
corporate farms.
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Fairweather (1992) concludes that the rapid exposure of farmers to international forces and
more market economy did not lead to the demise of family farming and a movement towards
corporate farming in New Zealand. If anything, he argues, exposure to financial pressure
strengthened family farming. This trend is partly confirmed by our results. While we
observed a strengthening of family farming between 1982 and 1992 in the dairy and
sheep/beef indu,stry, the position of family farming in terms of farm numbers has weakened
in the poultry, pig, crop, and horticulture industries. However, our analysis also shows that
between 19a7 and 1992 family farming strengthened its position with regard to agricultural
output in all but the crop and horticulture industries. This may be interpreted as a sign that
the deregulation of agriculture in New Zealand has indeed strengthened family farming as
Fairweather (1992) suggests. Moreover, consistent with Fairweather (1992), our results
indicate that under normal circumstances operating returns on capital are not high enough for
corporate shareholders. When land prices fall substantially, as they did between 1982 and
1987, then there is the potential for operating returns plus capital gains to offer shareholders
interesting returns on investment. As our results and Fairweather (1992) suggest, that is
when corporate farming gains in strength; once land prices start to recover, the potential for
attractive returns on investment changes, and as a result, corporate investors withdraw from
pastoral farming.
2.4 Conclusions
Previous studies analysed the status of family farming in the United States and Europe, both
cases where farms are beneficiaries of government support programmes. The results of these
studies show that the demise of the family business in agriculture that many researchers
predicted has not taken place despite the capital-intensive features of modem production
technologies in agriculture. However, these studies did not show whether family farming
would also have survived in the absence of government support programmes. Hence, we
studied the status of family farming in New Zealand in order to find an answer to that
question.
The agricultural sector has traditionally played an important role in the New Zealand
economy. Most agricultural industries in New Zealand are export-oriented; they account for
more than half of all exports. Since the initiation of the deregulation of the agricultural
sector in 1984, fanners in these industries have been fully exposed to the vagaries of
international agricultural markets, such as the wide price fluctuations, the costs of compiling
and analysing information of changes in the global markets, etc.; they do not benefit from
government support programmes such as minimum price schemes, income support
programmes etc. Hence, there exists no agricultural policy that specifically focuses on the
survival of family fanning.
Our results show that the family farm Ls' the dominant form of farm organization in an
agriculture that Ls' characterized not only by modern, capital-intensive technology and
dependence on world markets. but additionally. by the absence of government support
programmes. Hence. thLs' suggests that the survival of the family business as the dominant
form of organization in agriculture l:S' not so much the result of government support
programmes but rather the consequence (?f otherfactol:s'.
We observed that those industries with a comparatively high output per hectare ratio, such
as the poultry, pig, and horticulture industries, also have a relatively high degree of non-
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family fanning. Poultry and pig fanns may buy in all the animal feed from anywhere in the
country or the world; horticultural products can be produced in greenhouses or totally
independent of natural soil as in hydroponics. Hence, the production process in these
industries is largely free from the seasonality of nature and random effects of the weather.
As our results showed, the majority of farms in these industries may still be family fanns;
in tenns of output value, however, non-family fanns dominated in these industries. Hence,
corporate farming is strongest in indus'tries where .land as a production factor has a similar
role as in industry, that is where production L~' almost independent of its landbase, the
seasonal cycles, and the uncertainty of the weather.
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CHAPTER THREE
FACTORS UNDERLYING THE
PREVALENCE OF FAMILY FARMING
In this chapter, we explain wiry the family farm persists in some agricultural industries as the
dominant form of organization despite the absence of government support. Sections 3.1 and
3.2 explain, respectively, the rationale underlying the analysis of the determinants of family
farming, and the methods and materials used. Section 3.3 illustrates and discusses the role
of economies, transaction costs, and non-pecuniary benefits as determinants of the size and
organizational form of farms in the dairy and sheep/beef industry. Section 3.4 draws
conclusions.
3.1 Rationale Underlying the Analysis of the Determinants
of Family Farming
Our explanation of the prevalence of family farming is based on the following notion.
Consistent with Alchian (l950) and Jensen (l983), we assume that organizations compete
with each other to deliver activities or products demanded by customers, and that "[t]hose
organizations survive that are able to deliver the activities or products at the lowest price
while covering costs" (Jensen 1983, 331). This "survival of the fittest tautology" (Jensen
1983) implies that "what is, is efficient". For our study it follows that if a particular form
of organization exists, it is an efficient form in the sense that it enables the owner of the
organization to maximize his or her utility function at least as well as any other form of
organization. If not, it would not exist because the owner would select a different form. In
other words, we conjecture that if we observe the family farm-which is one of several
possible organizational forms in agriculture-to survive and possibly dominate in an
agriculture characterized by the absence of state intervention, it is because the family farm
can deliver the bundle of those activities or products demanded by its customers-the family
is one of them-as efficiently as all other competing forms of organization.
Moreover, we regard the following three factors as the key elements that need to be analysed
in order to understand the prevalence of family farming in an agriculture such as New
Zealand's, where the establishment of large corporate farms is unobstructed by natural
constraints and state intervention.
According to economic theory. technological economies of scale (Georgescu-Roegen 1976;
Panzar 1989) and transaction costs (Coase 1937; Jensen and Meckling 1976; Williamson
1979; Fama 1980; Arrow 1985) are key determinants of the structure and size of firms.
However. unlike the typical firm in industry, the family farm is an amalgamation of
household and firm. Hence, unlike most firms a family farm may not produce commodities
solely for the market; it may also produce goods and services for household consumption.
Among those goods and services supplied to the household may be non-pecuniary benefits
such as job satisfaction, social prestige. independence etc. Becker (1976) shows that the
behaviour of households-and therefore of family farms-cannot be adequately understood
by an approach which ignores the household's non-pecuniary returns; for the household
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maximizes its utility function subject to its full income constraint, which comprises both
pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns. That is why we regard, consistent with Chayanov
(1966), Gasson et al. (1988), Reinhardt and Barlett (1989), Schmitt (1989), and Henning
(1992), the non-pecuniary benefits accruing to the farm family from farming as another key
factor that needs to be considered in order to understand the incidence of family farming in
agriculture without state support.
This section is organized as follows. Sub-Section 3.1.1 briefly outlines our assumptions
concerning the effects of economies of scale, transaction costs, and non-pecuniary benefits
on the structure and size of firms in general. In Sub-Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 we
explain, respectively, the roles of economies, transaction costs, and non-pecuniary benefits
in agriculture, and their effects on the competitiveness of family farms vis-a.-vis large-scale
corporate farms.
3.1.1 Effects of Economies of Scale, Transaction Cost~, and
Non-Pecuniary Benefit~ on the Structure and Size of Firms
In the absence of transaction costs it is conjectured that the size of firms in a production
sector positively correlates with the significance of economies of scale in that production
sector. Consequently, where economies of scale are present beyond the size of family
firms-other things being equal- we expect larger than family firms to dominate.
Conversely, where we observe that family firms dominate, we conjecture that economies of
scale are insignificant beyond the size of family firms-other things being equal.
However, transaction costs are present. On the assumption that they rise as the network of
interdependence in an organization widens, organizations are confronted with a trade-off
between economies of scale and transaction costs (Bardhan 1991). Hence, in a production
sector where economies of scale are present, the coexistence of small firms and
comparatively larger firms is explained by the advantage of small firms over their larger
competitors in terms of transaction costs.
Where non-pecuniary benefits accrue to the owners of a firm from a particular organizational
form, they have the possibility of trading off non-pecuniary for pecuniary income. As a
result, we may observe that a particular organizational form of firm survives or possibly
dominates over alternative organizational forms despite the fact that its unit costs of
production are higher than those of its competitors. In this case we conjecture that the owner
of the firm derives non-pecuniary benefits inherent in the chosen form of organization and
that they are high enough to compensate him or her for the income loss incurred by his or
her choice of a form of organization with sub-optimal unit costs of production.
3.1.2 Tl}e Role of Economies in Agriculture
Relationship between Economies of Scale, Size, and Scope
To prevent confusion in the discussion of the role of economies the relationship between
different concepts needs to be explained.
A firm may produce one or several goods; the theory refers to the single- and multiproduct
case respectively. In the concept of technological economies ofscale economies exist in an
interval of an output if the unit costs (average cost) of producing the output under a given
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technology (no technological change) are decreasing in that interval (Silvestre 1987). The
proportions among input factors and-in the multiproduct case-among the goods produced
are kept constant in this case (Gold 1981). By keeping output proportions fixed the
multiproduct output is treated as a commodity bundle, or say as a single composite good; this
enables the economies of scale concept to focus on the behaviour of costs as the size of the
resulting output bundle is varied (Baumol, Panzar, Willig 1982). In contrast, the concept of
economies ofsize relates to situations with variable input proportions. This concept measures
changes in costs as inputs expand in a cost minimizing non-proportional manner with the
expansion of output (Hallam 1993a).
The concept of economies ofoS'cope relates to situations in which the cost of producing two
products in combination is less than the total cost of producing each product separately in its
own specialized firm. The presence of economies of scope creates an incentive for specialty
firms to merge and become multiproduct firms (Baumol, Panzar, Willig 1982).
The economic literature explains economies of scale and size by indivisible inputs and Adam
Smith's division of labour. Where an input factor such as a machine, plant, or labour with
specific knowhow is indivisible, that is, the factor becomes useless if divided, economies of
scale exist up to the point at which the indivisible factor is fully utilized. 17 Adam Smith's
argument is that the expansion of production makes labour division and job specialization
possible, which in tum results in an increase in output that exceeds the increase in inputs.
Economies of scope are explained with the presence of public or quasi-public inputs, that is
inputs with the quality of public goods. In multiproduct firms, some production factors are
public inputs in the sense that, once they are acquired for the production of one good, they
are available at no extra cost for use in the production of others (e.g. pond used for fish
culture and watering for grazing animals, or farmland used for agricultural production and
the provision of lifestyle); other production factors have quasi-public character since their
services can be shared by several production lines without complete congestion, as, for
example, a plough used for summer and winter crops (Baumol, Panzar, Willig 1982).
As the term implies, the concept of technological economies of scale or size focuses on
economies of a technical character in the production process; other concepts extend the
definition to cover business activities other than production such as marketing, financing, etc.
(Silvestre 1987). Pecuniat)' economies may result from lower costs of inputs (Smith,
Knutson, Richardson 1986) or reduced costs of marketing due to the size of operation, timing
of input purchases and output marketing, vertical integration and spatially separated markets
(Hallam 1993b).
Rationale for the Insignificance ofEconomies ofScale
In industry the family firm has become rare and the large-scale factory has become
ubiquitous due to the relative advantage of factories to capture available economies of scale.
However, Georgescu-Roegen (1976) criticizes those who expect economies of scale to play
an equally important role in agriculture as in industry of losing sight of the fact that the
17 In the strict sense of the definition of economies of scale given above the proportions among all
input factors are kept constant. Hence, the indivisible input argument only explains economies of scale in the
short and medium run, where fixed costs such as indivisible machines are treated as sunk costs, and only the
proportions among the variable inputs are kept constant in an output interval.
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factory system "... is not (and, most likely, will never be) applicable to all production
sectors" (p.89). Indeed, he holds that" ... no parallelism exists between the law of scale of
production in agriculture and that in industry". For one thing, he says, "[o]ne may grow
wheat in a pot or raise chickens in a tiny backyard, but no hobbyist can build an automobile
with only the tools of his workshop". He asks, "[w]hy then should the optimum scale for
agriculture be that of a giant open-air factory" (p. 107). Moreover, he contends that the
role of time and the possibility to arrange production processes in an assembly-line style is
entirely different in the two sectors. While mechanization enabled us to shorten the time for
manufacturing goods, the gestation periods in animal husbandry or the period for maturity
in plants has not been shortened significantly. At the same time, Georgescu-Roegen holds,
that-with a few exceptions-it is impossible to arrange production processes in agriculture
as in an assembly-line system, because photosynthesis, the essential process in food
production, requires first of all solar energy, which only comes to each place on the earth
at various epochs of the year in a definite flow rate (p. 98); as a consequence, production
factors are inevitably rendered idle for part of the year by the seasonality of nature.
Georgescu-Roegen' s view is consistent with Brewster's (1950). With regard to pastoral
production systems they both expect economies of scale to be insignificant over a wide range
of farm sizes for the seasonality of climate, biological cycles of living things, and the
'spreadoutness' of the soil, prevent the arrangement of operations anywhere near the modem
simultaneous pattern which characterizes the factory system (Brewster 1950, 70).
Both Brewster (1950) and Georgescu-Roegen (1976) argue that the significance of economies
of scale in production largely correlates with the applicability of the factory system, that is,
the possibility to arrange individual operations in a fashion that the idleness of production
factors is eliminated (Georgescu-Roegen 1976).
Hence, in poultry/egg production, pig production, and other intensive livestock fattening a
comparatively lower degree offamily farming is expected than in pastoral livestock, dairy,
and crop production because the production in the former industries is clearly more
independent ofthe seasonality of the climate and less spread out than in the latter industries.
3.1.3 The Role of Transaction Costs in Agriculture
Concept of Transaction Costs
Transaction cost is a catch-all term for a heterogeneous assortment of inputs (Niehans 1987).
They include costs ofcoordination and agency costs, that is costs of negotiating, monitoring,
and enforcing contracts.
In organizations, transaction costs ofcoordination are incurred by "... transmitting up through
the hierarchy the initially dispersed information that is needed to determine an efficient plan,
using the information to determine the plan to be implemented, and then communicating the
plan to those responsible for implementing it" (Milgrom and Roberts 1992, 29). As Milgrom
and Roberts point out, besides the direct costs of compiling and transmitting information, the
transaction costs of coordination also include the costs of delay while the communication is
taking place and while the centre is determining the plan.
Other transaction costs, the so-called agency cost.,', are incurred by the potential of moral
hazard and adverse selection, i.e. the possibility of opportunistic behaviour in social relations
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in which information is asymmetrically distributed (Janvry, Sadoulet and Fafchamps 1991).
Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Arrow 1985; Hart and Holmstrom
1987) explains agency costs with the incentive problem inherent in a principal-agent
relationship, which arises in the presence of asymmetric information and divergent interests
between the principal (e.g. landowner) and the agent (e.g. farm tenant or farm worker).
Agency costs are the sum of costs of structuring, bonding, and monitoring contracts, and the
costs caused by the fact that it does not pay to enforce all contracts perfectly (Jensen 1983).
A conflict of interest arises where the agent's work effort, say working harder, increases both
the principal's income and the agent's disutility. The principal-agent literature distinguishes
between two cases of asymmetric information: hidden action and hidden knowledge.
In the case of hidden action the agent's action can neither be directly observed by the
principal nor be deduced on the basis of observable outcome because the outcome is assumed
to be influenced not only by the agent's action but also by uncertain factors outside the
agent's control (Stiglitz 1987). Thus, the principal cannot specify and enforce the desired
level of work effort because he cannot verify whether a poor outcome is due to the agent's
shirking or to an unfavourable state of nature (Hayami and Otsuka 1993). While asymmetric
information in the case of hidden action arises once the contract (e.g. employment contract)
has been signed (ex post), hidden knowledge may be present before (ex ante) or after the
signing of a contract. Where the principal, say the farmer, is not familiar with the
characteristics (e.g. ability, work ethic, etc.) of the llgent, say the farm worker who applies
for a job, asymmetric information is present ex ante; the principal faces the so-called adverse
selection problem. In the case where hidden knowledge exists ex post, the principal does not
know whether the agent took the action the principal would himself have undertaken in the
given circumstances. Although the principal can observe the action, say the ploughing of a
field, he may not know whether the action taken by the agent was appropriate, for instance,
because he does not have the same knowledge of the soil quality as the agent.
In order to prevent opportunistic behaviour incurred by hidden action, the principal may try
to monitor the agent or design a compensation scheme which motivates the agent to act in
the principal's interest. To avert negative externalities from hidden knowledge, the principal
may try, first, to select on the agents' quality either by "screening", that is offering the agent
a range of contracts that induces the agent to reveal his or her true qualities, second, by
testing the agent's qualities, or third, by inquiring about the agent's past performances18 .
However, negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contract which gives an agent the
necessary incentives to refrain from shirking, as well as testing and screening an agent's
qualities or inquiring about an agent's past performance are costly.
Rationale for Transaction Cost Advantages ofFamily Fanus
Pollak (1985) examines in his article the strengths and weaknesses of the family farm with
respect to transaction costs. He argues that the family's ability to provide incentives and
monitor performance differs from that of other organizations. Indeed, he concludes that the
family farm can minimize the agency problem better than any other form of organization,
first, because the farm family's members have claims on family resources, and therefore have
an interest in maximizing the value of the family's resources, and second, because the
18 Naturally, this problem is minimal in small, face-to-face communities (Hayami and Otsuka 1993).
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entwined relationship of farming with family actIvItIes provides the family with an
information advantage concerning the performance of family members.
Where a family member who is also a shareholder of the farm business is hired, the risk of
opportunistic behaviour by that employee is reduced to a certain extent since he is both
principal and agent. Opportunistic behaviour reduces the residual profit and value of the
farm (of which the employed family member is a residual claimant and shareholder).
However, the hired family member is not the only residual claimant; the loss in profit
induced by his opportunistic behaviour is shared with all the other shareholders of the farm.
On the assumption that the hired family member maximizes his or her utility, he or she
reduces his or her opportunistic behaviour only to the point where marginal benefits from
opportunistic behaviour and from work effort are equal. The risk of opportunistic behaviour
decreases as the claim of the hired family on farm profits and assets increases. Thus. the
degree by which the risk of opportunistic behaviour can be averted largely depends on the
share of farm ownership held by the hired family member.
Where hired family members do not own a share of the family's resources, farm owners-in
this case the family-are faced with the basic incentive problem of a principal-agent
relationship that gives rise to transaction costs. However, Pollak (1985) argues that the
family farm has the advantage over a farm with hired labour, say, a corporate farm, because
economic relationships are entwined with significant personal ones. On family farms
"[d]iligence and work habits, consumption patterns and lifestyles are more likely to be
observable because the network of relationships involving 'economic activity' and 'family'
are integrated" (p. 586). Small communities also provide information on the reputation of
community members, and therefore, also avert moral hazard and adverse selection to a
certain extent (Bardhan 1991; Hayami and Otsuka 1993). Pollak maintains, however, that
the family has an information advantage over larger social communities because social
contacts within the family provide information unavailable to outsiders.
It should be noted, however, that a moral hazard problem only arises in the presence of
divergent interests between the principal and the agent. Though, as Milgrom and Roberts
(1992) state, "[d]ifferent individuals' interests may naturally be quite well aligned in
particular circumstances" (p. 185), Family members, for instance, who have non-pecuniary
incentives in their utility function, say pride in doing an expert job, fulfilling family
obligations, social respect etc. do not necessarily' need a monetary incentive in order to
abstain from shirking or misusing farm land and capital. As Arrow (1985) argues,
professional responsibility is not only enforced by monetary incentives but in a good measure
by systems of ethics, which were internalized during the education process. Loyal behaviour
is not confined to employed family members, i.e. non-family employees may refrain from
shirking without monetary incentives due to work ethics; however, in most cases cheating
one's family is considered worse than cheating strangers (Pollak 1985), and the risk of
disloyal behaviour by non-family member therefore is presumed to be higher.
Notwithstanding its advantages, Pollak (1985) also cites limitations of family farms. Family
conflicts may spill over into the farm business sphere so that family ties-a source of strength
in the absence of conflicts-can turn into a source of weakness for the business. On the
other hand, family ties may hinder an objective and dispassionate evaluation of a family
member's ability and performance because of the negative consequences of sanctions on the
personal relationships among family members. Thus, business conflicts may have a negative
effect on the family sphere. Finally, the family may lack the capacities and special talents
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required by the business, so that technologically achievable economies of scale are not
realized and activities that require special aptitudes are carried out inefficiently on these
family farms.
However, on the basis of the reason..."; given above, the family farm organization is presumed
to be potentially more efficient than hired labour farms in terms of transaction costs, first,
where workers, for technological reasons, cannot be gathered and supervised in a single
location as in plantation agriculture, egg and poultry production, feedlot production etc.,
second, where it is difficult to enforce work effort by tying pay to output (e.g. on a piece-rate
basis) because of random and uncontrollable factors in the production process, and third,
where specific, local knowledge (which is difficult for non-jamily labour to possess) is vital
for the proper management of the farm as in ecologically sensitive areas.
3.1.4 The Role of Non-Pecuniary Benefits in Agriculture
As mentioned above, the capital-oriented firm, say the corporate firm can attract investors
only by offering a competitive return on capital. Capitalists consider the risk and return on
capital of alternative investment options and-other things being equal-invest where the
expected return on capital is highest. In a competitive environment with alternative
investment opportunities, the corporate firm thus has to maximize shareholders' value, or say
profits in order to offer its shareholders an attractive return on their investment; managers
of corporate firms have to take investment and production decisions with consideration of the
marginal return on invested capital.
Inthe case of the family farm, on the other hand, it is important to recognize that the family
takes account of more than solely profit in its decision process; it allocates its resources with
tll.e objective of maximizing its utility rather than farm profit. The family's utility function
comprises a range of variables, so-called Z-commodities such as prestige, independence,
satisfaction derived from the job, the family, the living area etc., which the household
produces by combining capital goods, raw materials, market goods and time (Becker 1976).
Farm profit is only maximized to the point where its marginal utility is equal to those of
other sources of utility.
Hence, contrary to the corporate firm, the family also considers non-pecuniary benefits in
its decision calculus; it maximizes its utility function subject to its full income constraint,
which comprises both pecuniary and non-pecuniary income (Becker 1976). As a
consequence, family farms may keep up production for a monetary return lower than what
they could earn elsewhere because they do not want to lose the non-pecuniary benefits the
family members derive from the farming activities. Clearly, this is a decision in favour of
the non-pecuniary benefits which they would lose if they gave up production, and against the
additional consumption made possible by strictly maximizing their monetary earnings
(Henning 1992).
We may even observe that families keep up production despite continual pecuniary farm
losses. They may be willing to support their farm lifestyle with income from non-farm
income because they find-in the absence of tax advantages derived from farm losses-that
the non-pecuniary benefits from farming more than compensate them for the pecuniary farm
losses. For these recreational farm families the presence of non-pecuniary benefits is the
only reason for being engaged in agricultural production. Thus, theoretically, the amount
of money income forgone measures the cost of obtaining the additional utility from farming
(Becker 1976).
41
Furthermore, farm families may be willing to pay a price for land that exceeds its productive
value; this is the case where farm families seek to acqui}e not only a production base but also
a mix of non-pecuniary benefits which they perceive as unique to farming their own farm.
Hence, given that they have the necessary funds at their disposal, utility-maximizing farm
families are able to outbid other potential buyers in the land market such as capital-oriented
corporate farms, which can purchase land only at a price which reflects its productive value.
Hence, where non-pecuniary benefits' accrue to farm families from their farming activities,
family farms may survive or even dominate over capital-oriented farms such as corporate
farms even where their unit costs ofproduction are higher than those of corporate farms.
3.2 Methods and Materials
This section first discusses the problem of measuring economies, transaction costs, and non-
pecuniary benefits in Sub-Section 3.2.1. Sub-Section 3.2.2 then outlines the objectives and
focus of our approach and the materials used for the analysis of the relative importance of
economies of scale, transaction costs, and non-pecuniary benefits as determinants of family
farming. Sub-Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4 describe the details of the analysis of production cost
data and farm interviews respectively.
3.2.1 Measurement of Economies, Transaction Cost~,
and Non-Pecuniary Benefit"
Measurement ofEconomies
While it is generally accepted that the presence or absence of economies of scale play a
significant role for the size of firms and structure of an industry, "... the appropriate ways
to analyze and measure this phenomenon remain a subject of much disagreement" (Hallam
1993a, 150).
The problem with technological economies of scale is that they are defined in terms of
properties of the production technology of the firm without reference to factor prices; thus,
it is difficult to relate technological economies of scale concepts to the cost conditions facing
a firm (Panzar 1989). Hence in contrast to the economies of size concept, which relates to
situations with variable, cost-minimizing input proportions, the concept of technological
economies of scale does not provide us with an operational basis for cost analysis because
it "...does not bear the desired relationship to the properties of the firm's cost curves"
(Panzar 1989, 7). Estimations of economies of size are problematic, first, because it is
difficult to stratify farms by technology, and second, because of the unknown variation in the
quality of management and other inputs (Stefanou and Madden 1988); in other words, the
effects of size changes cannot be distinguished from the effects of differences in technology
or quality of management.
Hence, a more useful approach to assess the relative importance of economies of scale, size,
or scope is to identify "... the primary objectives motivating managerial decisions involving
choices among alternative scales" (Gold 1981, 25), because other factors than technological
economies, such as transaction costs, pecuniary economies, and producer preferences may
be more important for the explanation of the viability of a particular size structure such as
the family farm (Hallam 1993a).
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Measurement of Transaction Costs
The transaction cost approach offers a set of reasons why the production efficiency of
alternative institutional forms might differ; however, it cannot offer unambiguous predictions
about which form is more efficient for unobservable variables play a key role in the
transaction cost approach (Pollak 1985; Henning 1992), and therefore, pose severe
measurement problems (Williamson 1989). Where transaction costs are difficult, and
perhaps impossible, to quantify, the analysis of contracts, institutions and economic
arrangements have to rely on qualitative methods (Jensen 1983; Niehans 1987).
Measurement ofNon-Pecuniary Benefits
The consideration of non-pecuniary benefits explains why family farms might differ from
corporate farms in their production-related behaviour. However, as in the case of transaction
costs, the precise assessment of the role of non-pecuniary benefits such as job satisfaction,
independence, flexibility etc. is problematic because it is faced with the problem of dealing
with unobservable variables (Witzke 1991; Henning 1992).
3.2.2 Objectives and Focus of Study Approach and Materials Used
Against the background of the measuring problems discussed above, the analysis of the
factors underlying the incidence of family farming was approached as follows. On the
assumptions that cost conditions playa key role in determining firm and industry structure
(Panzar 1989), and that production activities are carried out by those institutions which-by
minimizing costs including transaction costs-can perform them most efficiently (Jensen
1983; Pollak 1985), in a first step, the unit costs of production of farms, i.e. the sum of
production costs in the narrow sense and transaction costs, were analysed. Production cost
data from Livestock Improvement New Zealand and the NZ Meat and Wool Boards'
Economic Service were used for the analysis of the unit costs of production of farms of
various size in the dairy and sheep/beef industries respectively. The analysis of cross-section
data has the advantage of being based on reported rather than estimated cost performance of
actual farms. However, it does not enable us to estimate economies of scale or size due to
the technological variability among farms and the unknown variation in the quality of
management and other inputs (Stefanou and Madden 1988).
However, notwithstanding its limitations with regar9 to analysing the specific roles of
technological economies of scale and transaction costs, it is a useful approach to analyse the
relative competitiveness of small aI}d large farms in terms of their unit costs of production.
In commodity markets farmers-such as New Zealand's-are price takers; consequently, the
unit costs of production are-other things being equal-what determines the relative
competitiveness of farms in these markets. What interests us first, is whether any of the
relatively small family farms can deliver agricultural commodities at unit costs of production
as low as relatively larger farms. If so, it is an indication, that economies are indeed either
insignificant or compensated beyond the size of family farms. For those farms which do not
produce at minimum unit costs of production, we conjecture on the grounds of the survival
of the fittest tautology (that is "what is, is efficient") that they must realize economies of
scope in the production of agricultural commodities and other activities or products, such as
non-pecuniary benefits demanded by the family. If not, they would not exist.
Because of the omnipresent measuring problems discussed above, complementary to the
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analysis of production cost data, a qualitative approach was used to assess the relative
importance of economies, transaction costs and non-pecuniary benefits as explanatory factors
of the incidence of family farming. Interviews with operators of both small and large farms
were conducted to identify, the primary objectives underlying farmers' choices among
alternative farm scales and organizational form.,. The interviews were used to answer such
questions as to whether farmers perceive any particular size of farm as ideal, whether larger-
than-family farms have an advantage over family farms in terms of economies and costs of
coordination, what the advantages or disadvantages are of substituting hired non-family for
family labour, whether the incentive problem inherent with employees can be solved with
production related compensation schemes, what kind of non-pecuniary benefits farm families
derive from farming, and how important these are to farm families.
In order to test for bias, poor recall or inaccurate articulation-all factors inherent in
interviews (Yin 1984)-the interview results were compared with evidence from the economic
literature and our production cost analysis.
Since over 80 percent of the farms in New Zealand are pastoral dairy and sheep/beef farms,
this study focuses on the analysis of the role of economies of scale, transaction costs, and
non-pecuniary benefits as determinants of the size and organizational form of farms in the
dairy and sheep/beef industries.
3.2.3 Details of the Analysis of Production Cost Data
Calculation of Unit Costs of Production
Production cost data from Livestock Improvement New Zealand19 and the New Zealand
Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service (NZMWBES) were used for the analysis of the
unit costs of production of farms of various size in the dairy and sheep/beef industries.
Production costs were calculated as follows:
Total Farm Expenditure (exclusive of paid interest)
+ Opportunity Cost of Invested Capital
= Cost of Production
A detailed description of the composition of the cost of production is given in appendices I
and II. In order to get a reflection of the full costs of production, we imputed the
opportunity costs of the capital invested in the farm. The problem with this approach is that
the value of the invested capital, say in land, may be influenced by non-agricultural factors,
such as non-pecuniary benefits ascribed to rural living; where this is the case, the value of
the invested capital may be less a reflection of its value for agricultural production than of
its amenity value. Assuming that the size of farms and the relative weight of agricultural
factors vis-a-vis non-agricultural factors both positively correlate with the distance between
farms and agglomerations, we expect the distortion of the costs of agricultural production
<::aused by non-agricultural factors to be greater for small farms than large farms. Hence,
19 Livestock Improvement Corporation is a subsidiary of the New Zealand Dairy Board. Its main activities
are herd testing and artificial breeding services offered to farmers, a farm advisory extension service and
research aimed at improving dairy farm profitability. 11h~ Farm Statistics Section of Livestock Improvement
provides farm survey and statistical functions to the Dairy Board.
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without the influence of non-agricultural factors on the capital value of fanns, the unit costs
of production of small fanns would be lower than they appear in our analysis.
The only item not included in the cost of production is the reward for the fanner's own
labour. Using an average estimate of the opportunity cost of fanners' labour for all fanns
was considered to be distorting for on a small fann the opportunity cost of the farmer's
labour may be significantly lower than on large fanns (Ahearn, Whittaker, and EI-Osta
1993). Small fanns may be managed on a part-time basis after regular working hours or by
a retired person; in these cases, the opportunity costs are, no doubt, lower than a farmer's
salary who manages a large farm operation.
For dairy fanns one kilogram of milkfat was used as unit of output. Thus, the unit costs of
production of dairy farms were measured in costs per kilogram of milkfat. For the
comparative analysis of the unit costs of production of dairy fanns of different size, costs per
kilogram of milkfat were plotted against the output of milkfat.
The analysis and illustration of the unit costs of production of sheep/beef farms was more
complex. Most sheep/beef farms are multiproduct fanns that produce wool, sheepmeat, and
beef. Since a conversion of the three products into a comparative unit, such as energy
equivalents is problematic, the unit costs ofproduction of sheep/beeffarm...~ were measured
in costs per stock unit. Stock unit is a measure for putting different livestock on an equal
basis; one stock unit is equivalent to one breeding ewe (55 kg). Appendix III shows the
stock unit conversion ratios used for the calculation of the total number of stock units on
fanns.
For the comparative analysis of the unit costs of production of sheep/beef fanns of various
size, th~cost per stock unit ratio was plotted against the two dimensions 'meat output' and
'wool output'. Meat output comprised lamb, mutton, beef, venison, and goat meat.
NZMWBES calculates the wool and meat output as follows:
Meat Production
Wool Production
=
=
(weight of stock on hand at close) + (weight of
stock sold) - (weight of stock on hand at open) -
( weight of stock purchcl<;ed)
(wool sold) + (wool on sheep's back at close)
(wool on sheep's back at open) - (wool on sheep
and lambs bought in)
The unit costs of production of sheep/beef farms were analysed with production costdata for
1989/90, while the analysis of the unit costs of production of dairy farms is based on data
for 1991/92.
Methodology ofDairy Fanll Surve)' and Characteristics ofSurvey Fanlls
Every year Livestock Improvement conducts the Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy
Fanners20 . The purpose of the survey is to estimate dairy farmers' financial perfonnance.
20 In 1991/92, ninety-six percent of New Zealand dairy fanns were factory supply dairy herds. 1l1ese
herds are managed as seasonal supply units and have their milk processed into dairy products by cooperatively
owned dairy companies.
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For the 1991/92 survey, 452 dairy farms were randomly selected. From these farms, 17
percent did not meet the survey criteria, which consequently reduced the sample size to
376. 21 Fifty farms declined to be surveyed, while another 32 were either unable to be
contacted or did not keep their appointment. Hence, 294 farms or 78 percent of the 376
dairy farms that were contacted provided data. However, a portion of the 294 surveys could
not be processed, so that a sample size of 264 farms remained.
The survey covers both owner-operated (203 observations) and sharemilked dairy farms (61
observations). However, for the analysis of the unit costs of production of dairy farms we
only used owner-operated dairy farms for the cost accounts of sharemilked farms do not
show the total expenses of the farm but only those of the sharemilker; hence, the cost
accounts of sharemilked farms were not comparable with those of owner-operated farms.
Table 3.1 shows some details of the surveyed dairy farms by herd size. The sample
comprised 203 owner-operated farms. The farmed area ranged from 16 hectares to 424
hectares and the number of cows milked varied between 55 cows and 770 cows. Labour
input was in no case lower than one labour unit; only in one case it exceeded 7 labour units.
As the figures show, the number of farms was small in some classes; hence, means shown
for each herd size are not representative but rather have indicative character.
Table 3.1
Survey Dairy Farm Details by Herd Size, 1991/92
Herd Size (in Number of Cm~~~)
Survey 40 00 80 100 120 150 200 250 300 400 500
Farm Details -59 -79 -99 -119 -149 -199 -249 -299 -399 -499 -999
Number of Farms 2 10 8 25 54 50 18 19 8 6 3
Means
Total Labour (iu) 1.00 1.65 1.41 1.43 1.70 1.93 2.66 2.68 2.66 4.66 4.75
Family 1.00 1.A5 1.35 lAO 1.57 1045 1.79 1.59 1.53 1.42 2.75
Labour (iu)
Hired Labour 0.00 0.00 0.06 (L03 0.13 0048 0.87 1.09 1.13 3.24 2.00
(iu)
Herd Size (Cows) 56 69 87 109 133 172 213 268 333 429 646
Productive Area (ha) 20 51 41 54 57 74 112 111 153 186 288
Source: Livestock Improvement. Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy Farms
Only 15 farms (7.4%) had a labour input that exceeded three labour units, and-according
to our definition of the family farm-did not qualify as family farms. In 184 cases (90.4%)
family labour accounted for more than 50 percent of total labour input. Thus, neither a
comparative analysis of the unit costs of production of family farms and larger-than-family
farms, nor the analysis of the correlation between the number of hired labour units and unit
21 Reasons for exclusion were: less than 30 cows, no separate accounts for the dairy fanning enterprise,
less than 50 percent of gross income is derived from dairying, fanner did not complete full season, incomplete
infonnation, moving to a new farm, or farmer leases majority of dairy faml.
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farms, nor the analysis of the correlation between the number of hired labour units and unit
costs of production was useful. However, for a comparative analysis of the unit costs of
production of small and large dairy farms, the data were useful.
Methodology ofSheep/Beef Fanll Survey and Characteristics ofSurvey Fanlls
The New Zealand Meat and Wool Boards' Economic Service conducts the annual New
Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey. The survey sample of approximately 530 farms is
randomly selected and stratified by geographical regions, flock size, and by farm class22 .
All farms in the sample winter at least 750 sheep or their equivalent sheep plus cattle stock
units, are privately owned (i.e. not run by the State), derive at least 70 percent of the farm
revenue from sheep or sheep plus beef cattle (except in the case of class 8), and are run
neither as stud nor as dealer-type farms.
In order to increase the comparability of farms for our analysis, we only used North Island
Hard Hill Country farms (farm class 3), North Island Hill Country farms (farm class 4),
North Island Intensive Finishing farms (farm class 5), and South Island Finishing-Breeding
farms (farm class 6). These farm classes comprised 74 farms, 168 farms, 86 farms, and 64
farms respectively. From the original sample of 392 farms we then eliminated all farms with
income from. cropping (53 observations), farms where total meat production was negative for
the year (l observation), and farms where deer or goats accounted for five percentor more
of the total number of stock units (32 observations).23 The resulting sample used for the
analysis comprised 312 sheep/beef farms. 24
In 281 cases (90.4%) family labour exceeded 50 percent of total labour. Furthermore, 304
(97.4%) 6fthe sheep/beef farms in the sample had no more than three labour units, in other
words, these farms were no larger than what we defined as the largest family farms. Hence,
as in the case of dairy farms, the data were useful for the analysis of the unit costs of
production of small and large sheep/beef farms; however, neither a comparative analysis of
the unit costs of production of family farms and larger-than-family farms, nor the analysis
of the correlation between the number of hired labour units and unit costs of production was
possible.
Table 3.2 shows some farm details of the analysed sheep/beef farms by flock/herd size. It
should be noted again, that due to the small number of farms for some flock/herd sizes the
means in the table have only indicative character.
Labour input on farms ranged from 0.5 labour units to 6.1 labour units. The smallest and
largest flocks comprised 779 stock units and 26,390 stock units respectively. The farm with
22 The eight farm classes are: I. South Island High Country Farms; 2. South Island Hill Country Farms;
3. North Island Hard Hill Country Farms; 4. North Island Hill Country Farms; 5. North Island Intensive
Finishing Farms; 6. South Island Finishing-Breeding Farms; 7. South Island Intensive Finishing Farms; 8. South
Island Mixed Finishing Farms.
23 Cropping farms and farms where deer or goats account for a large percentage of their total stock units
tend to have a significantly different cost strueture than sheep/beef farms; hence. the comparability would have
been reduced if these farms had not been eliminated from the sample.
24 Six farms complied neither with the cropping criterion nor the deer/goat criterion.
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the smallest productive area farmed 55 hectares while the largest farm in terms of farmed
area comprised 2,711 hectares.
Table 3.2
Survey Sheep/Beef Farm Details by Flock/Herd Size. 1989/90
Flock/Herd Size (in Stock Units)
Survey 500 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000
Farm Details -999 -1,999 -4,999 -9,999 -14,999 ?15,00O
Number of Farms 5 47 191 59 7 3
Means
Total Labour (Iu) 1.00 0.98 1.27 2.08 2.75 5.49
Family Labour (Iu) 1.00 0.97 1.14 1.31 1.70 1.00
Hired Labour (Iu) 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.77 1.05 4.49
Flock/Herd Size (su) 856 1,624 3,314 6.627 10,886 20,271
Sheep (%) 67 73 71 68 69 58
Cattle (%) 33 27 28 31 31 42
Deer and Goats (%) 0 0 1 1 0 0
Productive Area (ha) 71 157 325 718 1,044 2,141
Productivity
Wool/Sheep su (kg) 5.0 5.2 5.1 5.3 5.2 5.6
Sheepmeat/Sheep su 7.7 9.3 8.5 7.8 8.6 8.7
(kg)
Beef/Cattle su (kg) 14.6 24.1 19.0 13.2 13.4 11.5
Source: NZ Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service, New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey
Since unit costs of production for the sheep/beef industry were measured by cost per stock
unit, farms were analysed for the sheep/cattle ratios and for stock performance (output per
stock unit); high costs per stock unit may be the result of a high sheep/cattle ratio, a "high
input - high output" production system or an inefficient size of farm. Table 3.2 shows the
average flock/herd composition and stock performance for each flock/herd size. Across all
farms, sheep and cattle averaged 71 percent and 28 percent of the flock/herd respectively.
Means testing (at the 0.05 level of significance) showed that the sheep/cattle ratios did not
differ significantly between the six flock/herd sizes. Regarding stock performance, only one
significant difference was observed: the average beef production per cattle stock unit for the
second smallest flock/herd was significantly higher th::ln for the third largest flock/herd.
3.2.4 Details of Farm Interviews
Methodology of Interviews
An equal number of small and large dairy and sheep/beef farmers was selected from various
lists of addresses provided by Federated Farmers NZ, Livestock Improvement, and Farm
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Management Department at Lincoln University. Farms were not selected by random
sampling; hence, statistically, the interviewed farmers do not represent the population of
farmers.
Labour input detem1ined whether a farm was labelled "small" or "large". Farms where
labour input did not exceed three labour units qualified as small all other farms as large
farms. Forty-two interviews were conducted in total, of which nineteen were with dairy
farmers, twenty-one with sheep/beef farmers, and two with sheep/beef farm consultants. All
the interviewees lived and worked in the South Island but in different farming regions. The
dairy farms were situated in Canterbury and Southland, the sheep/beef farms in
Marlborough, Canterbury, and Southland, and the two consultants were active in Canterbury
and Southland.
The interviews were conducted during the late autumn months April and May 1994, the slack
period on most farms. A pretested questionnaire with mostly open questions provided the
framework for the interviews (see appendix IV). The interviews were recorded on paper and
tape. Where necessary, the notes were completed after the interview with the help of the
tape recordings. The time required per interview ranged from 1 1/2 to 3 hours. In those
fifteen cases where the farmers' spouse was present during the interview the spouse's view
was also recorded. Their views were particularly valuable for the questions concerning non-
pecuniary benefits from farming since these questions referred not only to the farmer but to
the farm family as a whole.
Interview Fan1l Characteristics
The group of interviewed farmers was comprised of owner-operators, 50/50 sharemilkers,
and farm managers representing three different types of farm ownership. Owner-operators
owned both the farmland and the farm business. Characteristic for farms with 50/50
sharemilkers was the separation of farm business from farmland ownership. Farms with
managers were totaliy absentee owned.
Table 3.3 illustrates some characteristics of the interview farms. Of the six dairy farms with
sharemilking agreements, the land of four farms was owned by single private owners or
private partnerships; in two cases the farmland was owned by public companies. Of the four
managed farms three were owned by single private owners or private partnerships. One
managed sheep/beef operation was state-owned.
Eighty-five percent of the interviewed farmers had farmed before 1984; hence, the majority
of farmers were experienced in farming under the constraints of a regulated and deregulated
agricultural economy. The difference in the number of years during which the interviewed
farmers had been operating their farms highlights two points. First, the short period of five
years on average for large dairy farms reflects the fact that most large dairy herds in the
South Island have been established only in recent years as a result of changing economics.
Second, dairy farmers tend to change farms more frequently than sheep/beef farmers because
of the sharemilking possibility that exists for dairy farmers. Many dairy farmers start their
farm careers as small-scale sharemilkers because they lack the necessary equity to buy their
own farm. As these farmers build up their assets in the form of dairy COWs-before they sell
part of their herd in order to buy their own farm-they take on new sharemilking positions
on larger farms milking more cows. A similar system does not exist in sheep/beef farming;
thus, sheep/beef farmers tend to remain on the same property longer.
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Table 3.3
Details of Interview Farms
Dairy Farm Sheep/Beef Farm
Interview Farm Details small large small large
Number of farms 9 10 10 11
Owner-operated 6 6 10 8
Sharemilked/-farmed 3 3 0 0
Managed 0 1 0 3
Farms where family labour ~ 50% 4 1 10 1
of total labour
Means
Number of years on present farm to 5 13 20
Size of farm (ha) 160 315 656 27,252
Number of cows 273 653 n.a. n.a.
Number of stock units n.a. n.a. 4,200 37,271
Number of labour units 2.41 4.71 1.75 8.85
Sheep/beef farmers overall farmed a larger area than dairy farmers. Only eight sheep/beef
farms were smaller than the largest dairy farm. The smallest dairy farm in terms of stock
had a herd of 16 cows, the largest milked 1,050 cows. The number of stock units on
sheep/beef farms varied between 2,000 and 93,000 stock units. Labour input in the farm
business ranged from one labour unit to thirty labour units. Family labour accounted for
fifty percent or more of total labour in the case of all small sheep/beef farms and forty
percent of all farms.
3.3 Results and Discussion
Sub-Section 3.3.1 shows whether unit costs of production in the dairy and sheep/beef
industries correlate with farm size, or whether both small and large farms have the potential
to produce milkfat cost-efficiently. In Sub-Section 3.3.2 we illustrate what farmers perceive
as the ideal farm size and organizational form in their industries. We show farmers' opinion
on 'the optimum farm size', economies, the role of on-farm information and communication,
the advantages and disadvantages of family and non-family labour, and the effectiveness of
production related compensation schemes. Sub-Section 3.3.3 illustrates the non-pecuniary
benefits that farm families derive from farming and how important these are to farm families.
In Sub-Section 3.3.4 we discuss and compare our results with those of previous studies.
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3.3.1 Correlation between Farm Size and Unit Cost~ of Production
in the Dairy and Sheep/Beef Industries
Unit Costs ofProduction ofDairy Famls
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Figure 3.1
Unit Cost~ of Production of Dairy Farms. 1991/92
Figure 3.1 shows the unit costs of production of the 203 analysed dairy farms. The "cloud"
in the figure suggests that farm size-measured by milkfat output-and unit costs of
production are uncorrelated in the dairy industry. The model using a linear relationship
between milkfat output and unit costs of production explained only 3.15 percent of the
variation in unit costs of production (R2 = 0,031542). From the log-linear model we
obtained a R2 of 0.075607. These results were confirmed when farms were grouped byherd
size. 25 At the 0.05 level of significance, t-tests showed that the mean unit costs of
production did not vary significantly between the classes except for the second smallest herd
size with 60 - 79 cows, where unit costs of production were significantly higher than in any
of the larger classes. This is illustrated in Table 3.4 (see Appendix V for detailed results of
the analysis of variance).
25 Grouping farms by herd size rather than milkfat output was considered legitimate for a high linear
correlation was identified between the number of cows and the milkfat output of farms (R2 = 0.90473).
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Our results suggest, jirst, that farm size does not explain the unit costs ofproduction ofdairy
farms. Second, relatively small and large farms both have the potential to produce millifat
cost-efficiently. Consequently, large farm..'> do not necessarily have a competitive advantage
over family farms in terms of unit costs ofproduction. Thus, the hypothesis that economies
in dairy production are either insignificant or compensated by transaction costs could not be
rejected.
Table 3.4
Unit Cost., of Production of Dairy Farms by Herd Size
Herd Size (in Number of COl~~<;)
Survey 40 60 80 100 120 150 200 250 300 400 500
Farm Details -59 -79 -99 -119 -149 -199 -249 -299 -399 -499 -999
Number of Farms 2 10 8 25 54 50 18 19 8 6 3
Cost per kg of Milkfat 6.09 7.47 5.83 5.53 5.29 5.20 5.54 5.56 5.55 5.87 5.11
Source: Livestock Improvement. Economic Survey of Factory Supply Dairy Farms
Unit Costs ofProduction ofSheep/Beef Fanus
Figures 3.2a and 3.2b both illustrate the unit costs of production of the 312 analysed
sheep/beef farms. The figures show that large farms do not produce meat and wool at lower
costs than small farms; this suggests that there is no inverse correlation between the costs per
stock unit and farm output as we expect in the presence of economies. Indeed, a linear
model with wool and meat output as independent variables explained no more than 10.77
percent of the variance (R2 = 0.107712). Since a high positive correlation exists both
between wool production and sheep stock units (the linear model explained 84.5 percent of
the variation in wool production), and between meat production and total number of stock
units (R2 = 0.714807), an alternative model with stock units as independent variable was
also used. This model generated a coefficient of determinance (R2) of 0.065565.
Moreover, we grouped farms by flock/herd size-measured in number of stock units-and
analysed the variance of the unit costs of production of each group. Table 3.5 illustrates the
average unit costs of production of each flock/herd size. The variance analysis showed (at
a 0.05 level of significance) that the unit costs of production of the smallest and second
smallest flock size were significantly higher than those of all other flock/herd sizes, and that
the mean unit costs of production of flocks/herds with 2,000su to 4,999su were significantly
higher than that of the next bigger flock/herd size with 5, OOOsu to 9,999su (see appendix V
for detailed test results). This suggests that the potential to decrease unit costs of production
is exhausted by farms with a flock/herd size of 5,000 stock units. Since farms with
flocks/herds of 5,000su-9,999su required 2.08 labour units on average, these results
suggest-as Figures 3.2a and 3.2b did-that farms of the size offamily farms are able to
produce ·wool and meat as cost-efficiently as lar,ger-than:familyfarms. Hence, the hypothesis
that economies in the pastoral production of meat and wool are either insignificant or
compensated by transaction costs' beyond the size offamily farms could not be rejected with
our data.
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Figure 3.2a Unit Costs of Production of Sheep/BeefFarmS, 1989190
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Figure 3.2b Unit Costs of Production of Sheep/Beef Farms. 1989/90
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Table 3.5
Unit Costs of Production of Sheep/Beef Farms by Flock/Herd Size
Flock/Herd Size (in Stock Units)
Survey 500 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000
Farm Details -999 -1,999 -4,999 -9,999 -14,999 ?15,000
Number of Farms 5 47 191 59 7 3
Costs per Stock Unit 86.39 55.90 45.37 40.46 44.22 40.18
Source: NZ Meat & Wool Boards' Economic Service, New Zealand Sheep and Beef Farm Survey
3.3.2 Farmers' Opinion on the Size and Organizational Form of Pastoral Farms
Dairy Fanners' Choice ofFaml Size
The interviewed dairy farmers differed in their opinion on the optimum size of a dairy farm.
The results are illustrated in Table 3.6. Basically, two groups of opinion emerged. Twelve
fanners regarded one or two particular sizes of farm as ideal, while seven dairy fanners
argued that large and small dairy farms could be equally efficient provided they were
managed properly; in their view, whether a farm size was ideal depended solely on a
fanner's preferences and abilities. Some farmers prefer the physical to the administrative
aspects of fanning or lack the necessary labour management skills, for instance, because little
emphasis had been put on these aspects in their farm training. These fanners prefer fanns
with no or 1-2 hired labour units so that they themselves can be "hands-on" fann managers
rather than full-time administrators of larger operations. Other fanners enjoy managing
labour and therefore aim at operating large- scale dairy fanns.
Table 3.6
Preferred Dairy Farm Size (in Labour Unit~)
T)pe of Interviewee
Preferred Labour Input Small Farmer Large Farmer All Farmers
---------------- (Frequency ofAnswer) --------------
1 Labour Unit (Iu)
21u
3 lu
> 3lu
No particular number
3
o
4
o
4
1
3
2
3
4
1
7
2
7
Note: Because some interviewees regarded two or three sizes as equally efficient the frequency of
answers in the last column is larger than the number of interviews conducted with farmers.
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Two farmers explicitly advocated the 'one labour unit farm', with up to 200 cows as the
most efficient size. They maintained that farmers generally do a better job than hired staff
because farmers work with their own assets. In their view, cow performance and, therefore,
labour productivity decline with the employment of permanent full-time or part-time labour.
Furthermore, the wife of one of these two farmers held, that there is less tension in the
family without hired labour living on the farm.
Two farmers regarded the 'one labour unit farm' as one of two efficient farm sizes; the
alternative being a dairy farm with 300-400 cows operated by the farmer and 1-2 hired
labour units. Like six other farmers who explicitly advocated the three labour unit farm as
the optimum size, they believe that 1-2 hired labour units additional to the farmer's labour
increase labour flexibility on the farm, and that this additional flexibility compensates for the
loss in cow performance concomitant with hired labour. In their view, the additional labour
allows everyone on the farm to have more and regular time off work and thereby reduces
stress levels. Atthe same time, they held, that the additional flexibility enables farmers to
get away from the daily milkings and to focus more on strategic management issues.
Proponents of the '2-3 labour unit farm' see advantages of this farm size in terms of
flexibility also over larger dairy farms. Contrary to large hired labour farms, they claim that
farms with 1-2 hired labour units can, if necessary, cut wage expenditures by 50 percent to
100 percent by substituting labour from the farm family for hired labour. On larger farms
a cut in wage expenditure of a similar proportion would most likely have to be parallelled
by a reduction in the number of cows because of insufficient extra family labour capacity.
Hence, wage expenditure, a significantcost item on farms, is in their view not as fixed on
1-2 hired labour farms as on large hired labour farms because it can be reduced without
incurring a drop in production.
Those two farmers who favoured farms with more than three labour units contended that
these farms can better accommodate a labour rotation system with structured working days
and regular days off; thus, farmer and farm workers do not constantly have to work at their
full capacity but have reserves to handle peak periods and stress situations better.
Six farmers claimed that farms with more than 400-500 cows tend to slip in efficiency. They
held against farms of that size that cows have to walk too far to the milking shed, which in
tum results in a drop in milk production, that the farmer on a large farm has to spend too
much time monitoring staff, and that the optimum timing of important tasks such as getting
the cows in calf becomes more difficult because less attention can be paid to the individual
animal.
In sum, results from interviews sholl' that there was not a majority ofdairy farmers selecting
a particular farm size as optimal. Dairy fanners' choice ofa particular farm size is largely
a junction oftheir personal preference with regard to labour management and administrative
work and less the result ofan evaluation ofcost-sa vin!} characterL"tics of various farm sizes.
Dairy farms without hired labour capable ofmilking up to 200 cows are not perceived as too
small to produce milkfat cost-e.!llcient(y for modern production technology is also available
to dairy farmers with 200 COli's. Hence, from a technological perspective there is scope both
for farmers with and without hired labour to operate cost-efficient dairy farm businesses.
This view l:" consLwent with the re.<.:ults from the analysis ofproduction cost data presented
above.
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Sheep/Beef Fanners' Choice of Fan1l Size
The following Table 3.7 shows the size of farm, in terms of labour input, which the twenty-
one interviewed sheep/beef farmers and two farm consultants regarded as the optimum size.
Eighteen of the twenty-three interviewed sheep/beef farmers and farm consultants selected
a farm size with no more than three labour units as the potentially most efficient farm size
in sheep/beef farming. Only one farmer regarded a farm size with more than three labour
units as ideal. Four farmers did not select a particular size because they felt that whether
a farm size was ideal or not largely depended on the farmer's abilities and preference.
Table 3.7
Preferred Sheep/Beef Farm Size (in Labour Unit~)
Type of Interviewee
Preferred Labour Input Small Farmer Large Farmer Consultant Total
---------------------- (Frequency ofAnswer) -------------------
1 Labour Unit (Iu)
21u
31u
> 31u
No particular number
5
4
o
o
2
2
3
4
I
2
2
1
2
o
o
9
8
6
1
4
Note: Because some interviewees regarded two or three sizes as equally efficient the frequency of
answers in the last column is larger than the number of interviews conducted with farmers.
Of the two interviewed farm consultants one regarded the 1-3 labour unit farms as the most
efficient farm sizes. He cited that farmers have the calibre to run 1-3 labour unit farms very
efficiently. Farms of this size, argues this consultant, do not have the clumsy reporting
structures of larger farms and test the skills of farmers more effectively than larger fanns.
On large properties, farmers are reliant on sub-managers' decisions which in turn erodes
their skill base and makes it more difficult for them "to keep their fingers on the pulse".
The second consultant selected those farms with no hired labour, or alternatively, three
labour unit farms running 2,500-5,000 and 10-15,000 stock units respectively, as the
potentially most efficient farms. According to this farm consultant three labour unit farms
have more labour flexibility in the case of sickness, injuries, holidays etc.; however, he
believes the real key to success and efficiency is total commitment on the farmer's part to
work hard and have total control of the farm. From his experience the most efficient farmers
were those" ...who were in the work right up to their elbows but still knew where they were
going; and in those cases where staff was employed, the employees were led by totally
committed farmers who knew what they were doing" .
Of the farmers, seven-two of them farmers with large farms-regarded farms operated by
farmers without permanent hired labour as efficient farm units. One of them regarded one
and three, another farmer one and two labour unit farms as equally efficient. They maintain
that-depending on the area, topography, and soil types-"one labour unit farms' can run up
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to 5,000 stock units and therefore have enough scope for diversification. One farmer argued
that large farms cannot react to changes as fast as farms with no or only little hired labour
because "... necessary changes have to be explained to people right through the system,
whereas without hired labour the farmer does not have to convince anyone of the envisaged
merits of a change". Farmers in favour of one labour unit farms enjoy working on their own
and believe it is important to be in full control of all aspects of the farm in order to maintain
a high level of efficiency. A manager of a large farm felt that there would be less pressure
and more lifestyle if he operated a farm on his own and did not have to organize work for
hired staff.
In total, seven farmers judged the 'two labour unit farm' as an ideal farm size. One of these
farmers argued that two labour unit farms have more scope than smaller farms to build up
buffers in preparation for adverse times. Others in this group held that farms of this size,
on the one hand, gain the necessary labour flexibility, in case of sickness, accidents,
holidays, weekends etc., and, on the other hand, only have a limited problem of having to
motivate and monitor hired staff. As one farmer put it: "you can monitor one bloke easily
but not ten". Another farmer in this group experienced it as "... a pain at times to run a big
place with hired labour; it's difficult to motivate staff as much as family members who have
the incentive of farm ownership". Farmers also mentioned that farms with more than one
hired married person often have staff problems due to conflicts among staff's partners.
The 'three labour unit farm' was the superior farm size for four farmers. In their view, the
advantage over smaller farms is that these farms can employ specialized staff and can
therefore diversify without slipping in performance. It is a farm size that gives flexibility
in shifting emphasis from one production sector to another according to the markets,and also
in adjusting stock numbers to climatic conditions without incurring a drop in lifestyle. The
advantage over larger farms is, according to proponents of this farm size, that it is a better
size for good business and farm management; the farmer can focus on the management of
the farm but is still "hands-on" to lead by example. They also contend that farms of this size
do not have the problem of having to double infrastructure, such as stock handling facilities
in order to get jobs done within a reasonable time. Proponents of three labour unit farms
argued that it is a manageable size with the advantages of a large operation.
Two farmers saw an advantage for farms with more than one labour unit in terms of the
farmer's job performance. They argued that because a farmer's ability and willingness to
do physically demanding jobs often declines with age, it is important that the farmer can shift
emphasis in his work description according to his physical condition and let younger workers
do the hard work.
In sum, the interviewed sheep/beeffanners and farm con..mltants regarded farms with 1-3
labour units almost unanimously as superior to latger operation..s· in terms ofefficiency. Even
the majority offarmers with latge fann..<.; perceived farms with up to three labour units as
potentially more efficient farm sizes than latger farms. 26 They hold that it L,,' a fallacy to
believe that efficienC)' L,,' a function of size. A,,· in the dairy industty the farmers' choice of
a farm with or without hired labour latgely depends on their spec{fic skill base and
preference.
26 This is an indication that farmers were not as bias\:..'d in their judgement of farms which were of a
different size than their own as one might suspect.
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Pecuniary Economies
Over half of the interviewed farmers (11 dairy and 13 sheep/beef farmers) contend that large
farms have more purchasing power than small farms. According to these farmers large
farmers get discounts on interest rates, and especially, on fertilizer. However, two farmers
and one of the farm consultants maintained that purchasing power is a function of the
farmer's bargaining skill rather than a function of farm size. Moreover, they argued that
three or four relatively small farmers who purchase such inputs as fertilizer together may
make up a larger order than one large farm, and therefore, exploit the same discounts as
large farmers. Thus, farms of the size offamily farms may well have the potential to capture
pecuniary economies such as discounts on inputs.
l1ze Role of Infonnation and Communication
Several farmers (five dairy farmers and three sheep/beef farmers) felt that owner-operators
are more flexible in their decision making than managers of corporate farms because the
owner-operator does not have to report and is not accountable to shareholders. They argue
that it is an advantage of farms organized as family farms to have short communication lines.
As one of these farmers expressed it: "the owner-operator of a family farm does not have
the problem of red tape and dead wood up at the top". Two other sheep/beef farmers and
one of the consultants maintained that it is vital to have short communication lines for the
proper timing is one of the crucial factors for success. Once a farm operator has to rely on
other peoples' judgements, a farmer observed, more errors sneak in and the timing is more
difficult. That is why, two dairy and two sheep/beef farmers argued, the person who makes
decisions has to do the monitoring and be in the position to make decisions on the spot
without any delay.
The assessment of a situation and the communication of knowledge between manager and
staff, is considered to be particularly difficult where information on such things as the
weather, animal or pasture condition cannot be quantified objectively, either because
measurement tools are not available or too costly to have at hand, and therefore, the decision
maker has to rely on so-called "gut-feeling" and eye-assessment. Especially in the case of
large pastoral farms in ecologically sensitive areas (e.g. fragile soils, harsh weather
conditions) where the misjudgment of a situation can lead to a massive loss of stock or
irreversible loss of soil, a farmer argued, local knowledge is vital. This, however, can
usually not be learnt out of the text book but instead is acquired through several years of
experience. Where stocking rates per hectare are high, on the other hand, a good flow of
information on the state of stock and pasture is a crucial factor because overstocking quickly
results in a drop in stock performance.
The comparison of dairy and sheep/beef farms showed that while both type of farmers try
to back up their decisions with objective measurements (e.g. measuring stock weight, wool
weight, parasite levels in animals, animal fertility, soil quality etc.) sheep/beef farmers more
often than dairy farmers have to base their decisions on "gut-feeling" because the exact
quantification of information is uneconomic due to the terrain and size of many pastoral
sheep/beef farms. The land base of dairy farms is smaller but more fertile than that of dry
land sheep/beef farms. This allows the dairy farmer to monitor stock closely and manipulate
production to a certain extent with the use of irrigation water and nitrogen applications.
Moreover, dairy farmers-due to the daily milkings-can monitor the effects of a change in
inputs on production with only a few days delay, while sheep/beef farmers have to wait
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several weeks or months before they can weigh their stock to assess the effects of their
management decisions on stock performance. That is why, a sheep/beef farmer maintained,
it is essential for sheep/beef farmers to have the ability to detect trends in stock performance
without relying on objective measurements.
In sum, the interviews showed that the proper timing (~f actions t:~ (if crucial importance for
the success of the farm busines's. Pm1icularly in sheep/beef farming, however, there is
relatively wide room for errors in this respect. Due to the comparatively large area of
sheep/beef farms and the relatively long time gap between input flows and output flows,
information in sheep/beeffarming L~ not as quantifiable and the link between action and effect
not as transparent as in dairy farming. A~ a result, sheep/beeffarmers often have to base
their decisions on farm staffs' subjective assessments ofa situation rather than on hard data.
Family versus Non-Family Labour
Table 3.8 lists what farmers perceived as advantages and disadvantages of family and non-
family labour. The interviewed farmers perceived family members who work on the farm
as more committed to the farm business than non-family labour, especially during critical
times. As one farmer expressed it: "in a snowstorm you can't expect hired labour to work
twenty-four hours a day; the family does that because they protect their own assets".
Another farmer observed that "the sense of farm ownership makes family members put in
an extra effort; for instance, when it comes to digging out noxious weeds after a day of hard
work family members respect that, it has to be done".
Table 3.8
Advantages and Disadvantages of Family and Non-Family Labour
Type of Labour
Family Labour
Non-Fami£r
Labour
Advantage
- more commitment (26)
- work for less cash because of
non-pecuniary incentives (16)
- always available (10)
- do not work by the clock (9)
- have local knowledge (5)
- take pride in farm ownership (5)
- better communication (5)
- respect farmer's decision better (9)
- have required skills (8)
- no father-son disputes (2)
- bring new ideas on to farm (I)
- can be laid off during recession
(1)
DL<;advantage
- more family frictions (9)
- sometimes have unrealistic demands (5)
- sometimes lack necessary skills (5)
- discontinuous labour supply (3)
- do not mix well with hired staff (3)
- slackness is accepted (2)
- friction among in-laws (1)
- work by the clock (5)
- less privacy for farm family (3)
- work less hours (2)
- do not tighten belt during recession (1)
- difficult to motivate (1)
Note: Numbers in parentheses indicate how many times a criterion was mentioned.
The criterion mentioned second most frequently as advantage of family labour was that
family members work for less cash because they have the prospect of taking over the farm.
Moreover, in a downturn working family members more likely accept a drop in wages and
in lifestyle than non-family labour because family members are not only interested in cash
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but also in retaining the value of their fann assets.
Other points mentioned as advantages of family labour were their availability around the
clock and that they need less instructions than hired non-family labour because of their
knowledge of the fann and local environment. Finally, five fanners argued that the
communication of infonnation is easier among family members because" ... you are tuned in
to what they are thinking and feeling, and in general, to what is happening on the fann".
Notwithstanding these advantages, fanners argued that family members can be a handicap
for the fann business. According to the interviewed fanners and consultants family members
working on the fann are often a source of family conflicts. As an example, a farmer
observed that "there can be too many bosses on a farm". Correspondingly, fanners argued
that hired non-family labour respect the fanner's decisions better than family members. Two
farmers found that more slackness was accepted of family members than of non-family.
Moreover, several interviewees argued that family members may lack the special skills a
farm requires, while non-family labour can be recruited according to their specific skill base.
Thus, as a fanner maintained "if family members work on the farm by default it drags the
farm down".
In sum, according to the interviewed fanners the 'sense offarm ownership' is the source of
such important advantages offamily labour as commitment, willingness to retrench during
economically critical times or work extra hours when necessary. Moreover, working family
members who were raised on the farm, are likely to possess better knowledge of the
peculiarities of the farm and farm environment than hired non-family labour; this is
considered particularly advantageous' in ecologically sen...<.:itive areas.
However, where family conflicts spill over into the farm business, family ties hinder an
objective evaluation ofa family member's labourpetformance, or where family members lack
the skills the farm requires, other advantages offamily labour may be nul/{fied, or even
worse, turn family labour into a liability for the farm.
The Use and Effectiveness of Production Related Compensation Schemes
In order to motivate non-family labour to maximize their work effort, incentive schemes,
such as output related wages and salaries, were more frequently used in the dairy than the
sheep/beef industry. While almost half (8 fanners) of the dairy fanners with hired labour
(17 farms) used some form of incentive scheme only two sheep/beef farmers did. Table 3.9
illustrates farmer's opinion on the effectiveness of incentive schemes as an instrument for
aligning hired labours' interest with that of fanners'. While 82 percent of the sheep/beef
farm operators and both fann consultants believed that incentive schemes are ineffective, only
one of the dairy farmers was of that opinion; correspondingly, 94 percent of the dairy
farmers and 18 percent of the sheep/beef fann operators regarded incentive schemes as
effective or very effective. Four fann operators observed that some employees respond only
to monetary incentives, in other words the prospect of increasing their monetary income
induces them to increase their work effort, while other employees have the attitude to
maximize their work effort without that prospect.
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Table 3.9
Farmers' Opinion on the Effectiveness of Incentive Schemes
Type of Interviewee Ineffective Effective Very Effective
------------------- (Frequency ofAnswer) ------------------
Dairy Farmer
Sheep/Beef Farmer
Farm Consultant
Total
1
14
2
17
10
1
o
11
7
2
o
9
Those farmers who felt that incentive schemes are "ineffective argued that farm workers often
work as a team; thus, it is not possible for the farmer to single out the person who is
responsible for the success or failure. In these cases, they maintain that incentive schemes
only damage the team spirit, and therefore, are counter-productive. In order to get good
labour performance, they suggest, farmers should employ people with a good reputation, pay
them a fixed but top salary, offer them good training, and establish a good relationship with
them.
Both sheep/beef farm consultants ac:tvise their clients against the use of incentive schemes
such as production related salaries. According to their experience incentive schemes are used
very seldom in sheep/beef farming because of the vulnerability of the production results to
the weather and managers' decisions to increase and decrease stock numbers or change in
emphasis between farm sectors. Like other sheep/beef farmers they argued that staff should
be rewarded for their extra efforts especially during hard times although that is exactly when
farm productivity is lowest. A farmer expressed it as follows: "people may work really hard
but then the weather can very quickly tum a good year into a bad or average year; under
these conditions a production related incentive scheme is demoralizing for employees".
Moreover, the interviewed consultants argued that incentive schemes which are based on
annual production results develop a short-term orientation, which they regard as detrimental
in sheep/beef farming where a medium to long-term orientation is necessary in order to be
successful.
However, three sheep/beef farmers considered incentive schemes as effective. One of these
farmers sets production targets together with his employee for two separate parts of the farm
and lets his employee farm one of the two parts. Although the influence of the weather on
production remains, the employee's labour quality and effort becomes measurable in relative
terms-by comparing production results of the two parts of the farm-because farmer and
employee are exposed to the same climatic conditions.
In sum, the results from the interviews' s'how a marked difference between the two pastoral
industries with regard to the prevalence (?l incentive schemes and farmers' opinion on their
effectiveness as an in..<','{/1lment for aligning hired labours' with farmers' interest.
Generally, the opinion that eme/~f{ed from the interviews with sheep/beeffarmers was that
incentive schemes are d(tficult to implement in 5,'heep/beeffarming for the following reasons.
First, the weather is a random and uncontrollable production variable and has a strong
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influence on production results. The neutralization of the influence of the weather by
comparing annual production results Ls' difficult because sheep/beef fanners often change
emphasis between the various production sectors oftheir multi-productfarms over theyears.
Second, production results depend not only on farm workers' efforts but even more so on the
quality of the farmer's operating decisiolZ..'\, that is decisions which concern short-term
production. However, monitoring the effects ofoperating decisiolZ..<.; on production results is
problematic due to the relatively long time gap between input flows and output flows in the
production process and the presence of uncontrollable variables in the production process,
such as the weather. Hence, production targets as yardstick for measuring farm employees'
work effort are considered ineffective in sheep/beeffarming not only because of the erratic
character of the weather but also because a farm employee is seldom fully responsible for a
particular production sector.
The relatively wide use of incentive schemes in dairy farming in comparison with sheep/beef
fanning was explained with the single product character of dairy farms, the comparatively
short production process, the possibility of measuring quantity and quality of the output
almost daily, and the fact that, because of location, the climatic conditiolZ..<.; under which dairy
farms operate are often more moderate and more easily accommodated.
3.3.3 The Role of Non-Pecuniary Benefit., in the Farm Family's Decision
Calculus
Description ofNon-Pecuniary Benefits
Besides their monetary income farm families derive non-pecuniary benefits from farming.
Table 3.10 shows what farmers perceive as non-pecuniary benefits that accrue to themselves
and their families from their farming activities. Over 80 percent of the interviewed farmers
mentioned "the quality of farm life" as non-pecuniary benefit; while two thirds of dairy
farmers mentioned this criterion, all but one of the sheep/beef farmers did. 'Farm life' was
described by these farmers as "a life without noise,criminality, and pollution, a life away
from the crowds, with open spaces, little stress, and good community spirit, and a lifestyle
where the home is not separated from the workplace".
'Independence' was identified as a non-pecuniary benefit by 80 percent of the interviewed
farmers. One of these farmers described 'independence' as being "master of your own
destiny". Moreover, over half of the farrners regarded their flexibility at work as a non-
pecuniary benefit. They appreciate that they can arrange their daily work schedule, and
consequently, organize their work around their other interests. While the four farmers who
managed a farm for absentee-owners valued their flexibility, none of them mentioned
'independence' as a non-pecuniary bonus they derive from their farming activities. Indeed,
of the thirty-nine farmers-that is all but one dairy farmer-who valued an owner-operator's
position higher than a sharefarmer's and farm manager's, twenty-six mentioned "the total
independence of the owner-operator" as the crucial factor for their preference of the owner-
operators position.
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Table 3.10
Non-Pecuniary. Benefit~ Farm Families Derive from Farming
1)pe of Farmer
Non-Pecuniary Benefits Dairy Sheep/Beef All Farmers
--------------- (Frequency ofAnswer) --------------
Quality of farm lifestyle
Independence
Flexibility
Job satisfaction
Working outdoors
Working with nature
Satisfaction from developing farm
Time with partner and children
Share the bringing up of the children
Children see what parents do
Feeling of ownership
Stimulating environment for children
13 (68)
16 (84)
9 (47)
8 (42)
11 (58)
6 (32)
5 (26)
8 (42)
9 (47)
6 (32)
1 (5)
2 (11)
20 (95)
16 (76)
14 (67)
11 (52)
8 (38)
12 (57)
12 (57)
9 (43)
4 (19)
4 (19)
6 (29)
4 (19)
33 (83)
32 (80)
23 (58)
19 (48)
19 (48)
18 (45)
17 (43)
17 (43)
13 (33)
10 (25)
7 (18)
6 (15)
Note: The numbers in parentheses indicate the relative frequency with which a criterion was
mentioned in the specified class of interviewees.
'Working with nature', farmers noted, gives them "a deeper understanding of nature and the
natural cycles", "the feeling of being part of the ecosystem", "a link to the land", and
enables them to "see the next generations being born and how they grow". A farmer who
identified 'satisfaction from developing a farm' as a non-pecuniary benefit from their work
activities noted that "it is not so much the cash returns that drive you to develop a farm; by
developing a farm you put your mark on the land, and therefore, will be remembered".
Another farmer described it as "pure satisfaction to drag an old-fashioned place into modem
times by developing it". Furthermore, some farmers appreciated the feeling of owning a
business with which they can earn a living for their family, while others mentioned as non-
pecuniary benefit the "unique emotional feeling of actually owning land" and "preserving part
of the families heritage".
Several farmers argued that the fact that the family's home and workplace are not separated
on farms enables, on the one hand, farmers to spend more time with their families, see the
children grow up, and share in the bringing up of their children; on the other hand, it enables
children on farms to learn not only about their mothers' work but also experience their
fathers' work environment. Moreover, according to six farmers, farms provide a
environment where children do not get bored and learn to be self-reliant.
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Some interviewees27 believed that with alternative jobs they would gain such advantages
as more social contacts and social activities (13), regular time off (l 0), a higher disposable
income (8), and less pressure and income risk (5). Notwithstanding these advantages,
however, all interviewed farmers felt that the non-pecuniary benefits from farming outweigh
the perceived non-pecuniary benefits they would gain from possible alternative jobs.
In sum, self-employment and the natural environment and proximity ofhome and work place
are the sources ofnumerous non-pecuniary benefits that accrue to farmers and their families
from theirfarming activities. 'Independence' and 'the quality offarm life' were the two most
frequently mentioned non-pecuniaty benefits both by dairyfarmers and by sheep/beeffarmers.
Employedfarm managers enjoy similar non-pecuniary benefits as owner-operators. However,
what farmers perceive as the "total independence" ofan owner-operator is the incentive for
farmers to strive for the position of a farm owner-operator rather than for a sharefarmer's
or manager's position. Thus, farm ownership incorporates a valued non-pecuniary benefit
which is unavailable to sharefanners andfarm managers.
Vze Relative Value ofNon-Pecuniary Benefits from Fanning
The relative value put on the sum of non-pecuniary benefits that farm families believe they
would lose if they earned their livelihood with another activity than farming varied between
the interviewed farmers. Table 3.11 illustrates the relative value ascribed by farm families
to the sum of their non-pecuniary benefits. Almost 80 percent of all the interviewed farmers
considered the non-pecuniary benefits from farming worth more than their monetary income.
They would not accept a job offering double their monetary income. In fact, 16 percent of
the dairy farmers and 57 percent of the sheep/beef farmers-together comprising almost 40
.percent of all the interviewed farmers-felt that no salary could compensate for what they
would lose in terms of what they described as non-pecuniary benefits, if they left farming;
these farmers do not consider an alternative way of earning their living before they are
bankrupt.
Table 3.11
Subjective Value of Non-Pecuniary Benefit~ to Farm Families
T..-lpe of FarmerValue of Compensatory
Income for Loss of
Non-Pecuniary Benefits Dairy Sheep/Beef All Farmers
------- (Relative Frequenc.y of Answer) ------
::; Equivalent of monetary income
> Equivalent of monetary income
21
79
24
76
22
78
Farm managers who operate a farm for absentee-owners bear in mind that they have to move
off the farm sooner or later in order to leave the management of the farm to a younger
27 The numbers In parentheses indicate the number of farmers who mentioned that
criterion.
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person. Hence, two of the managers felt that "as a manager you have to be realistic and look
at any alternative opportunity". While one of them would consider jobs offering 25 percent
more than his salary as farm manager, the other expects from an alternative job at least 50
percent more than what he earns as manager. Of all the other farmers only one ascribed a
"value" to the non-pecuniary benefits from farming as low as those two farm managers did.
In sum, for fear oflosing non-pecuniary benefits which they perceive as unique to the life and
work on a farm the majority of interviewed farmers are not interested in a job offering even
double their monetary salary.
Ofall the farmers, farm managers ascribed a comparatively lower value to the non-pecuniary
benefits offarming. This suggests that employedfarm managers derive a lower share oftheir
total income in the form ofnon-pecuniary benefits than sharefarmers & owner-operators do.
3.3.4
Economies
Discussion and Comparison of Results with Previous Studies
Raup (1973) concludes from his review of the literature that virtually all studies of economies
of size in agriculture yield the conclusion that "[iln all but a few types of farming, well-
managed one- and two-man farms can obtain most of the gains to be had from increased
size" (p. 282). Day (1981) holds that there is a large range of nearly constant costs in
agricultural production. Our evidence from the production cost analysis also showed that the
largest farms analysed did not produce at lower unit costs than some of the comparatively
smaller family farms; this suggests that family farms can capture those economies of size or
scale that may exist for livestock farms according to the empirical studies reviewed by
Hallam (1993b). In their study of the unit costs of production in the England and Wales
dairy sector, Mukhtar and Dawson (1990) also show that least-cost production is achieved
by two-man dairy units of 140-180 cows.
Expanding the analysis of economies beyond the production process to the marketing of farm
output, Krause and Kyle (1970) maintain that "[t]he ability to deliver a uniform product on
a year-around basis increases the supplier's ability to influence price... " (p. 753); in other
words, they expect large farms to capture pecuniary economies in the marketing of their
output. However, our interviews with farmers showed that the seasonality in the production
process is present in the case of small and large farms. Hence, in pastoral production large
farms are unable to produce a uniform product on a year-around basis, and as a result,
cannot influence the output price any better than small farms.
Several authors (Raup 1973; Krause and Kyle 1970; Smith, Knutson and Richardson 1986)
argue that large farms can exercise market power in purchasing inputs, and therefore, expect
large farms to capture pecuniary economies resulting from discounts on the purchase of
inputs such as seed, fertilizer, crop chemicals and machinery, the timing of input purchases,
and vertical integration into input supply. Over half of our interviewed farmers also believed
that large farms capture pecuniary economies due to their market power.
However, Smith, Knutson and Richardson (1986) also found in their study that suppliers of
inputs preferably priced their goods to all commercial farmers at the same level. The
suppliers indicated a preference to deal with a large number of farmers with medium-sized
farms than with a small number of large farms, and that if they were to give a price break
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to large-scale farmers, it would cause discontent among the majority of farmers operating
smaller-scale farms, and as a result, that the discounts would spread across the market.
Moreover, their study indicates, consistent with the opinion of three of our interviewees and
Faris (1961), that the same pecuniary economies which may be obtained by larger-than-
family farms are at least in part available to purchasing cooperatives of smalI- and medium-
scale agricultural producers or to several farm operators acting jointly. In accordance with
three of our interviewees, Swanson (1961) argues that many of the pecuniary economies of
input acquisition should be credited to higher management quality rather than to farm size.
Hence, consistent with our study, the majority of the reviewed literature, suggests that
economies are insignificant beyond the size offamily farms in pastoral dairy and sheep/beef
production.
Transaction Costs
Like several of our interviewees, Reinhardt and Barlett (1989) maintain that large farms find
it more difficult than family farms to handle the complex ecological information that must
be processed for timely decision making. The uncontrolled nature of the climatic and
biological processes-disease can strike at any time and spread quickly-make agricultural
production unpredictable. Since the large scale and the separation of management and labour
complicate the direct observation of crops and livestock by managers, they argue that large-
scale farms suffer substantial information losses and distortions, and are slower in their
response than family farms. Moreover, they suggest that family members have an
information advantage over hired labour since "[m]uch of the information necessary for good
management of complex agro-ecosystems comes only through long-term observation of the
micro-environments under different circumstances" (p. 213). Their conclusion is that the
problems with supervision of labour and information loss and distortion effectively hinder
unchecked expansion of farm size; hence, family farm persistence is not only linked to the
insignificance of technological economies but also to managerial issues such as information
flow and distortion, timing and the supervision of labour.
Madden and Partenheimer (1972) argue that uncertainty and the cost of coordination are the
most important limitations on farm size. Stewart (1960) and Raup (1973) emphasize the
managerial limitations as important factor influencing the structure of farms. According to
Raup (1973) the costs of coordination can easily escape control in large agricultural firms.
Brewster (1950) does not expect an increase in management efficiency beyond the size of
family farms; he contends that an increase in the level of diversification multiplies the
number of on-the-spot supervisory-management decisions per acre so that the total acreage
which a unit of management can oversee quickly approaches the acreage which an ordinary
family can operate. Aereboe (1923) holds that the larger the farms the more difficult it is
to organize all workers efficiently and to stimulate the workers' interests in the success of
the farm. Tweeten (1984) maintains that "[t]imeliness in field operations and careful
husbandry of crops and livestock to control disease, pests and accidents seem more likely to
elude the salaried manager and wage laborer on a large farm and accrue to family farmers
whose way of life is at stake" (p. 27). According to Freeman (1985) large-scale farm units
are extremely difficult to operate efficiently and profitably for" [ilt is much easier to manage
and produce efficiently using 10,000 men in a factory on one acre of land than it is to
manage 1,000 people on 10,000 acres of land" (p. 146). He concludes that the family farm,
with a size large enough to apply modem technology, is the most productive size. Pollak
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(1985) maintains that due to technical peculiarities, the design and operationalization of a
compensation scheme which aligns the employee's interests with the farm owner's is difficult
to achieve and costly; that is why family farms have lower agency costs than hired labour
farms.
Hence, their view is consistent with our conjecture that economies are either insignificant or
compensated by transaction costs beyond the size of family farms. Our interviews also
showed that labour organisation is an important factor for the determination of farm size.
Particularly in the case of the sheep/beef industry results suggest that an increase in labour
input beyond three labour units, if anything, has a negative bearing on the unit costs of
production; because the accurate assessment of situations, the communication of knowledge,
the monitoring of labour and the design of effective production related compensation schemes
are considered particularly difficult in the case of sheep/beef farms. Hence, both, costs of
coordination and agency costs are expected to correlate with the size of farms.
Thus, the reviewed literature L,' consLs'tent with our conjecture that family farms in the dairy
and sheep/beef industries not only have the size to capture most economies, but also have a
form of organization that enables them to economize on transaction costs better than non-
family farms such as family-managed and corporate farm..<.;.
Non-Pecuniary Benefits
Robson, Gasson and Hill (1987) argue that "... the income position of farmers cannot be
adequately understood by a narrow approach which ignores the non-farm incomes they
receive" (pp. 188-89). Newby (1982) contends that the farmer's willingness to accept lower
rewards than the capital employed in agriculture could earn elsewhere shows that farming is
as much a 'way of life' as a business.
Indeed, our interviews confirmed that so-called Z-commodities such as independence,
satisfaction derived from the job, the family and the living area etc. are important variables
in the farm families' utility function, and comprise a substantial part of total income. As
Becker (1976) suggests, the family maximizes its utility function subject to its full income
constraint, which comprises both pecuniary and non-pecuniary income. The interviews
showed quite clearly that family farms may keep up farm production for a return on their
invested labour and capital lower than what they could earn elsewhere.
As Raup (1978) explains large-scale corporate farms must receive a rate of return on land
capital equivalent to their opportunity cost of capital or "... they find it exceedingly
burdensome to immobilize large capital sums in illiquid investments in land" (p. 306). In
contrast, farm families, as our interview results showed, include in their calculation of rate
of return-with full economic rationality-a variety of non-monetary benefits such as pride
of ownership, continuity of family, freedom of choice of work time and pace, ability to
identify effort with reward etc. As Raup (1978) emphasizes, the fact that "...owner-
operators of farm land have opportunities to value dimensions of intangible wealth that are
denied workers in nonproprietary businesses" (p. 306) explains why farm families can hold
large sums of capital in land at rates of return that large corporate farms cannot tolerate, and
consequently, why farm families can outbid profit-maximizing corporate farms in the land
market. Family farms may fail to cover opportunity costs of resources; however, they
"... are the result of informed families making the best use of their resources to increase their
utility" (Tweeten 1984, 23). As Henning (1992) suggests, it is a decision in favour of the
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non-pecuniary benefits which the fann families fear they would lose if they gave up farming,
and against the additional consumption made possible by a higher monetary income from an
alternative job and investment.
Hence, consi.',tent with other studies (Brewster 1958; Chayanov 1966; Raup 1978; Newby
1982; Gasson et al. 1988; Reinhardt and Barlett 1989; Henning 1992) our study suggests
that the decisive factor underlying the prevalence offamily farming in a modern pastoral
agriculture such as New Zealand's i.,' the logic offarm families to forego monetary profit in
return for non-pecuniary benefits.fi"omfarming. It also indicates that the relative magnitude
of the non-pecunimy benefits I:,' vety large, in the majority of cases being equal or greater
than monetary income from farming.
3.4 Conclusions
The conclusions from our analysis of production cost data and interviews with fanners and
consultants regarding the role of economies, transaction costs, and non-pecuniary benefits as
detenninants of the size and organizational form of fanns in pastoral agriculture may be
summarized in the following eight propositions:
1. Unlike in most industrial production sectors, families in the dairy and sheep/beef
industries have both the capital and enough labour capacity to own and operate cost-efficient
production units. Our results from the production cost analysis shows that larger-than-family
fanns in these industries do not have an advantage over family fanns in tenns of unit costs
of production.
2. Economies are in...r;;ign{ficant beyond the size of family farms both in dairy and
sheep/beeffarming. The relatively large area of pastoral fanns prevents the concentration
of operations similar to that of poultry and pig fanns; instead, it makes the doubling of stock
handling facilities necessary. Those technological economies of scale that exist in pastoral
agriculture due to the indivisibility of input factors or task specialization and pecuniary
economies such as discounts on inputs, can also be exploited by fanns of the size of family
fanns.
3. Tran...r;;action costs are likely to be higher for nonjamily farm..." than for family farms,
particularly in sheep/beeffarming. Familyfanns can economize better on tran...r;;action costs
arising from coordinating and monitoring management and labour than family-managed and
corporatefarms, first, because oftheir comparatively sh0l1 communication lines, and second,
because the likelihood ofa claim on family resources such as the farm, or the proceeds from
the farm sale, effective!.y induces fami!.y members to maximize their 11'01* effort and abstain
from shirking and other oppol1lmistic behaviour. The large areas of fanns and the influence
of random and uncontrollable factors such as the weather make the monitoring of labour and
implementation of production related compensation schemes difficult. Moreover, they
complicate the assessment of a situation and the communication of knowledge between fann
manager and fann staff, and therefore, the decision process and proper timing of actions.
4. In the daiT)' industry, the disadvantage (?f larger-thanjamily farms in terms of
tran...r;;action costs is not as evident as in the sheep/beef industry; hence family-managed farms
and corporate farms have a better chance (?f exi.r;;ting alongside family farms than in the
sheep/beef industT)'. The single product character, the comparatively short production
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process, the more moderate and predictable climatic environment, and the relatively small
area of dairy farms are all factors that mitigate the problem of enforcing hired labours' work
effort by direct monitoring or by designing output related compensation schemes. Hence,
larger-than-family farms in the dairy industry may economize on transaction costs equally
well as the family farms in their industry.
5. The share of income that accrues to farm families in the fonn of non-pecuniary
benefits is large and plays a pivotal role in the farm families' farm related decision making.
6. The possibitity of trading (?f( non-pecuniary for pecuniary income gives farm famities
a decisive advantage over cOlporate farms during times of crisis, and in those agricultural
industries where land L,> a nece.<:s'aI)' production factor as in pastoral fanning. During an
economic downturn family labour is more likely to accept a cut in wages and lifestyle than
labour employed by a corporate farm because family labour is trying to save not only their
wages but also their family assets.
Furthermore, investors such as shareholders of corporate farms expect a return on their
invested capital equal to the opportunity cost of their invested capital. Hence, in attempting
to maximize farm profits, corporate farms will purchase land only at a price which reflects
its productive value. In contrast, farm families are willing to pay a price for land that
exceeds its productive value for they seek to acquire not only a production base but also a
mix of non-pecuniary benefits which they perceive as unique to farming their own farm.
Hence, given that they have the necessary funds at their disposal, utility-maximizing farm
families are able to outbid other potential buyers in the land market such as profit-
maximizing corporate farms. As a result, we find that the price of land is higher than its
value for agricultural production; because the land price reflects the use value, that is the
sum of productive and amenity value which the land buyer ascribes to a piece of land.
7. Wherefamily and larger-than-familyfarms are on an equalfooting with respect to unit
costs ofproduction, the non-pecuniary beneflt.<i that accrue to the farm family from managing
and working their own farm provide the key to the family farm 's andfamily-managedfarm's
dominance over cOf770rate farms.
8. Since families withfamil.yfarms· andfamilies withfamily-managedfarms are likely to
derive similar non-pecuniat)' benejits from farming. the family farm 's dominance over the
family-managed farm L<i panly the result (if the family farm's superior ability to economize
on transaction costs. Other factors not included in this study, such as risk, may also be
involved. With regard to risk, we conjecture that its presence is likely to strengthen the
position of family farming vis-a-vis family-managed farming for the following reason.
According to the portfolio theory an investor theoretically achieves the maximum expected
return on his or her invested resources if those resources are invested in a diversified
portfolio because it eliminates the unique risk, that is risk inherent in the individual securities
of the portfolio. What remains is the market risk of the portfolio which depends on the
sensitivity to market movements and the covariance of the individual securities in the
portfolio. From this it follows that in the presence of risk, farmers-who are risk-averse
investors of their human capital and other resources-can increase their expected return on
their total investment by investing their resources in a diversified portfolio which includes
farm and non-farm investments whose returns are reasonably uncorrelated. Against this
background the dominance of family farms over family-managed farms may be the result of
the farmers' calculus to invest no more resources in a farm than necessary to exhaust the
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potential of economies-we have shown above that economies are likely to be minimal
beyond the size of family farms-and to invest the remaining resources in non-farm securities
in order to increase portfolio diversification, thereby increasing his or her expected return
on investment.
Assuming that the farmers' risk aversion is similar in the dairy and sheep/beef industries, the
comparatively higher incidence of family-managed farms in the dairy industry may therefore
not only be the result of the family-managed farms' ability to economize on transaction costs
better than their counterparts in the sheep/beef industry; it may also be the result of the less
volatile returns and therefore lower risk in the dairy industry. We suggest that the effect of
risk on the size and structure of firms in an agriculture without state intervention is made the
subject of further studies.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSIONS, WIDER APPLICABILITY OF FINDINGS,
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR AGRICULTURAL POLICY
In this chapter we first summarize our conclusions, then we argue why our findings are
applicable to agricultural sectors in other market-economies, and finally, we formulate
implications for agricultural policies such as the European Union's or Switzerland's which
today spend large sums of money and have interventionary policies implemented with the
purpose-among other objectives-of preventing the demise of the family farm.
4.1 Conclusions
If a market-oriented agriculture without state intervention, such as New Zealand's, was
incompatible with the notion of an agriculture of predominantly family farms, we would
expect family farms to account for an increasingly smaller proportion of all farms and
account for a decreasing proportion of the agricultural output.
However, our study showed that in the two main agricultural industries in New Zealand, the
dairy and sheep/beef industries, the position of family farming vis-a.-vis alternative
organizational forms was stronger eight years after the abolition of state support than prior
to deregulation. Moreover, our study shows that family farms have the potential to produce
as cost-efficiently in these agricultural industries as larger farms. Hence, in the case of
pastoral farming, the assumption that family farms will be eliminated because of their weaker
position with regard to 'economies of scale' has to be rejected. A more conceivable
conception is that economies are insignificant beyond the size of family farms and that family
farms have an advantage over non-family farms in terms of transaction costs which arise
from coordinating and monitoring management and farm labour.
The insignificance of economies and the transaction cost advantage of family farms rests on
the indispensability of land and the random effects of the weather in the production process.
Since, land and weather playa similar role in crop farming-excepting hydroponics-as in
pastoral farming, we presume that the observed dominance of family farming over both
family-managed and corporate farming in the NZ crop industry is also the result of the
insignificance of economies and the family farm's potential to economize on transaction costs
better than alternative forms of farm organization.
Where technological developments eliminate the dependence of the production process on
land and neutralize the random effects of the weather as in hydroponic vegetable and fruit
production, poultry and egg production, pig production, and intensive livestock fattening, we
expect the production process to be characterized by technological economies of scale and
the possibility to monitor management and labour as in a factory. As a result, non-family
farms such as family-managed and corporate farms are more likely to permeate and dominate
these industries.
73
We also showed that non-pecuniary benefits play an important role in the farm family's
decision to farm for a living, and that certain benefits unique to farm ownership provide
farmers with a strong incentive to strive for farm ownership rather than a manager's position
in a corporate farm. Hence, the key to the dominance of family-managed farms over "non-
family corporate farms" in industries which are characterized by a factory-type production
process, lies in the presence of non-pecuniary benefits that accrue to farm owner-operators
but are unavailable to managers who are employed by "non-family corporate farms".
Regarding the role of family farming in the future we come to the following conclusions.
Neither in the dairy industry nor in sheep/beef production there are signs of developments
which could give larger-than-family farms an advantage either in terms of economies or in
terms of transaction costs. Hence, the family farm is expected to remain the dominant form
of farm organization in pastoral dairy, sheep/beef, other livestock, and crop production. In
horticulture, poultry/egg production, pig production, and other intensive livestock fattening,
in contrast, we expect that an increasing share of production will be produced in production
systems which are largely land-free; thus, in these industries, the role of the family farm vis-
a-vis family-managed and corporate farms may decline further in the future.
4.2 Wider Applicability of Findings
The presence of significant economies of scale in mechanized manufacturing has-sooner or
later-brought about the elimination of the family firm by the capital-oriented firm in all
modem market-economies irrespective of differences in economic contexts, the households'
transaction cost advantages and the family firm's possibility to forgo monetary income for
non-pecuniary benefits. So, can our findings concerning the persistence of family farming
without state support be applied to other market-economies, despite their different settings,
or is the agricultural setting for instance in Europe too different from New Zealand's to draw
any conclusions from our observations in New Zealand?
Assuming that the insignificance of economies, the competitive advantage of family farms
with regard to transaction costs, and the presence of non-pecuniary benefits accruing to farm
families from their farming activities are indeed the three decisive factors underlying the
incidence and dominance of family farming in an agriculture free of state intervention such
as New Zealand's, we argue, for the following three reasons, that our findings concerning
the viability of family farming without state intervention are indeed applicable to European
agriculture, US agriculture, or agricultural sectors in other market-economies.
1. Iffamity /arm..., are able to capture any available economies in New Zealand, there
is no reason to believe that/amity/arms in the same industries elsel-vhere cannot also capture
such economies. To assume that family farmers in Europe or America cannot capture
economies available to larger-than-family farms to the same extent as family farmers in New
Zealand is to assume that relative to larger-than-familyfarms, European and American family
farms are unable to employ equivalent technologies achieving comparable efficiencies or that
they are unable to attain sufficient scale. It is difficult to conceive of barriers to employment
of equally efficient technologies existing for European and American family farmers which
do not exist for New Zealand family farmers. With respect to the question of scale, the
evidence presented in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that small to medium sized farms in New
Zealand are able to maintain unit costs of production as low as larger farms, although not
all of them do so. Thus, in the industries studied it appears that the farm size required to
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capture whatever economies may exist is in fact quite small.
2. The ability to economize on transaction costs better than family-managed and
corporate farms is not unique to family farm..(; in Nell} Zealand but L~ also characteristic of
family farms in other market-economies. It is implausible that larger-than-family farms in
other market-economies have an advantage over family farms in terms of transaction costs
of coordination, that is costs arising from compiling information and transmitting it through
the hierarchies and costs of delay while the communication is taking place and while the
centre is determining the plan of action.
Moreover, asymmetric information and divergent interests between the owner and the
employee of the farm-both necessary conditions for the incentive problem to arise in the
principal-agent relationship-are known to exist also in European and American agriculture.
Hence, agency costs, that is costs from negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing a contract
which gives the employee the necessary incentives, and costs from inquiring about an agent's
past performance are not confined to the New Zealand setting. Assuming that the European
or American farm family's ability to provide incentives and monitor performance does not
differ significantly from their counterpart's ability in New Zealand, we expect family farms
in American and European agriculture to have a similar advantage over family-managed and
corporate farms in terms of agency costs as in New Zealand.
3. Non-pecuniat)' benefits from farming are not only valued by New Zealand farm
families but also playa pivotal role in the decision calculus ofEuropean and American farm
families. It has been widely observed that many farm families in the USA and Europe have
remained in agriculture despite their failure to cover opportunity costs of their resources.
This indicates that the phenomenon to decide in favour of non-pecuniary benefits from
farming and against the additional consumption made possible by a higher monetary income
from an alternative job and investment (Henning 1992) is not only characteristic of farm
families in New Zealand but has also been observed in American agriculture (Brewster 1958;
Raup 1978; Tweeten 1984; Reinhardt and Barlett 1989), European agriculture (Gasson and
Errington 1993) and Russian agriculture (Chayanov 1966). Moreover, our study has revealed
that the non-pecuniary benefits are valued extremely highly in New Zealand and there is no
reason to believe that they are any less valued in Europe where those things valued are even
scarcer and their relative price therefore even higher.
We conclude therefore on the basis qf the above three reasons that iffamily farms dominate
in an agriculture where there are few if any barriers to expansion in farm size or the
establishment ofalternative forms ofor,ganiwtion, then we would not expect family farming
to be any less dominant orpersl:s'tent in circumstances where farm expansion is more difficult.
In contrast to most modern economies, New Zealand is characterized by an abundance of
productive farmland relative to the size of population. This, and the absence of regulatory
measures and policies hindering farm expansion have made possible in New Zealand the
establishment of large farms with the potential to exploit whatever advantages may exist.
Since we observed that family farms in New Zealand are able to capture whatever advantages
are available to non-family farms in pastoral agriculture, we presume that the family farm
would be in an equally strong if not stronger position vis-a-vis alternative forms of
organizations where, as in Europe. land is scarcer and the size of farms generally smaller
than in New Zealand.
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4.3 Implications for Agricultural Policy
For agricultural policies in modem Western economies which today have interventionary
policies implemented with the purpose of securing the viability of family farming vis-it-vis
large-scale corporate farming, we draw the following conclusions.
1. Agrarian land laws, tax policies, income policies and other measures that have heen
implemented with the purpm;e of preventing the demise of the family farm in pastoral
agriculture and land-based crop farming can be discarded for as long as land is available
for pastoral livestock and crop fanning, the family farm will be the dominating form offarm
organization in these sectors despite the absence of state support.
2. Without interventionary measuresfostering smallfamily farms and hindering structural
change, some smallfamily farms may dL<.;appear. thereby enabling the remaining family farms
to grow and exploit more oftheir potential. However, in a developed market-economy, such
as Switzerland's. with strong industrial and service sectors offering the possibility ofoff-farm
employment, an infrastructure permitting a high degree of mobility, and people showing a
preference for rural living (Veenhoven 1994). we conjecture that the survival ofsmall farms
is not at risk. The bulk offamities' with farms that are too small to provide a livelihood for
the family in a state without state support may well decide to subsidize their farm lifestyle
with an off-farm income rather than trade it for an urban living. Against this background
government intervention is neither a necessary factor for the persistence and dominance of
family farming nor for the survival ofsmall farms.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY
Does a market-oriented agriculture characterized by the absence of farm price and income
supports, supply controls, trade interventions etc. threaten or foster the status of· family
farming vis-a.-vis alternative organizational forms such as corporate farming? In other words,
does the family farm as an institution only survive thanks to agricultural policies supporting
it, or is this specific form of organization competitive against alternative forms in agriculture
so that it does not need government support to survive? These questions were the focus of
the first part of the study.
We attempted to answer these questions by studying the farm structure in New Zealand
agriculture, first, because it is the most market-oriented among OECD member states with
practically no government support for its farmers, who are heavily exposed to the vagaries
of world markets, and second, because the abundance of farmland and lack of regulations
place minimal limitations on the establishment of large corporate farms.
In Chapter 2, we showed, by analysing data from the nationwide agricultural census, that the
family farm not only survived but is the dominant form of farm organization in New Zealand
agriculture, and therefore, that the survival of family farming vis-a.-vis corporate farming is
not jeopardized by the absence of government support programmes. We also found-in
accordance with other studies-that the strength of family farming is not uniform across the
various agricultural industries. Industries such as the poultry, pig, and horticulture
industries, with a comparatively high output per hectare ratio, and a production process that
is largely free from the seasonality of nature and random effects of the weather, also showed
a relatively high degree of non-family farming. Although the majority of farms in these
industries were still family farms, non-family farms dominated in these industries in terms
of agricultural output.
In the second part of the study we analysed the determinants of the form of organization in
agriculture and attempted to explain, first, the persistence of the family business vis-a.-vis the
corporate firm in pastoral farming, New Zealand's major agriculture sector; and second, the
variation in the degree of family farming across the different agricultural industries.
Production cost data and interviews with farmers and consultants were used to identify the
relevance of economies and transaction costs,-according to economic theory the key
determinants of the structure and size of firms-, and to analyse the significance of non-
pecuniary benefits as explanatory factor of the incidence of family farming in pastoral
farming.
Consistent with economic theory, our results in Chapter 3 suggest, first, that economies are
insignificant beyond the size of family farms; second, that family farms have the potential
to economize better on transaction costs arising from coordinating and monitoring hired
management and labour than larger-than-family farms; and third, that farm families derive
a substantial share of their total farm income as non-pecuniary benefits which enables them
to accept a return on labour and capital that is substantially lower than that which profit-
maximizing corporate farms can tolerate. While the farm family's logic to forgo monetary
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income in return for non-pecuniary benefits from farming provides the key to the dominance
of family farms and family-managed farms over corporate farms, the family farm's potential
to economize on transaction costs better than larger-than-family farms could explain why the
family farm also has an advantage over family-managed farms.
Hence, in contrast to popular believe, we conclude that the survival and dominance of the
family farm in a modern market economy does not rest on government support programmes
but on the insignificance of economies, the .advantages of families with respect to transaction
costs and. the logic of farm families to forgo monetary profit in return for non-pecuniary
benefits frQm farming.
In Chapter 4, we looked at the wider applicability of our findings and their implications for
agricultural policy. We argued that the requisites for the survival of the family farm in a
setting without state intervention such as New Zealand's are not unique to New Zealand.
Hence, we conjectured that the family farm would also persist and possibly dominate in other
modern agricultures without state intervention.
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APPENDIX I
COMPOSITION OF PRODUCTION COSTS FOR DAIRY FARMS
Cost of Production for Dairy Farms
Cost Item
Working Expenses
Wageff
Animal Health
Breeding & Herd Testing
Dairy Shed Expenses
Electricity
Contractors
Pasture & Supplementsb
FertilizerC
Freight
Weed & Pest Control
Other
Overhead..'\
Repairs & Maintenanced
Vehicle Expensese
Standing Charge{
Interest
Administratiow
Total Cash Expenditure
Depreciationh
Total Fann Expenditure
Opportunity Cost of Invested Capital i
Cost ofProduction
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Notes
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
The sum of family wages and non-family wages; however, it does not include a
reward for the farmer's labour.
The sum of costs of silage, hay, meal, cropping, pasture renovation, and grazing.
The sum of costs of fertilizer, nitrogen, and lime.
Exclusive of repair and maintenance of private dwellings.
Exclusive of private car.
Exclusive of insurance costs of private dwelling.
The sum of costs of legal services, advisory, accountancy, telephone, mail and
postage, stationary and subscriptions, bank charges, and other.
Depreciation is taken "as is" from the accounts and includes all depreciation that is
allowable for taxation purposes but may not represent the true change of value of
farm assets.
The invested capital comprises the value of land and buildings, plant, and livestock.
The opportunity cost of the invested capital was calculated by multiplying the sum of
invested capital by the average of long term government security yields for 1991/92
(July to June), which was 9.13 percent (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 1991).
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APPENDIX 2
COMPOSITION OF PRODUCTION COSTS
FOR SHEEP/BEEF FARMS
Cost of Production for Sheep/Beef Farms
Cost Item
Working Expenses
Wage~
Animal Health
Shearingb
Electricity
Contract
Pasture & SupplementsC
Fertilizer!
Cartage
Weed & Pest Control
Syndicate Charges
Overheads
Repairs & Maintenance
Vehicles & Fuel
Standing Chargese
Interest
Administratiorl
Total Ca..<.;h Expenditure
Depreciation6'
Total Fann Expenditure
Opportunity Cost of Invested Capita liz
Cost ofProduction
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Notes
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
The sum of family wages and non-family wages; however, it does not include a
reward for the farmer's labour nor managers' and supervisors' salaries. Managers'
and supervisors' salaries are included under "standing charges".
The sum of shearing wages and shed expenses.
The sum of costs of feed, grazing, and seeds.
Includes lime.
The sum of costs of insurance & accident compensation, rates, managerial salaries,
and rent.
The sum of costs of legal services, accountancy, telephone, subscriptions, and bank
charges.
Depreciation is taken "as is" from the accounts and includes all depreciation that is
allowable for taxation purposes but may not represent the true change of value of
farm assets.
The invested capital comprises the value of land and buildings, plant, and livestock.
The opportunity cost of the invested capital was calculated by multiplying the sum of
invested capital by the average of long term government security yields for 1989/90
(July to June), which was 12.28 percent (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 1991).
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APPENDIX 3
STOCK UNIT (SU) CONVERSION RATIOS
Sheep
Ewes
Hoggets
Wethers
Rams
Cattle
Cows
Heifers 1.5 years
Heifers Weaners
Bulls Weaners
Steers Weaners
Steers 1.5 year
Steers 2.5 year
Bulls
Deer
Hinds Breeding
Hinds 1.5 year
Hinds Weaner
Stags 1.5 year
Stags Weaner
Stags Mature
Goats
Male & Female 1 year plus
Male & Female to 1 year
Buck
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1.0 su
0.7 su
0.7 su
0.8 su
5.5 su
4.5 su
3.5 su
4.5 su
4.5 su
5.0 su
5.5 su
5.5 su
1.9 su
1.8 su
1.8 su
1.8 su
1.8 su
2.1 su
0.8 su
0.5 su
0.8 su
APPENDIX 4
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE
Date
Time
Address
..... ./ ./ .
from: .
Name:
Street:
Town:
Phone:
to:
Fax:
Farm Type Dairy: > 3 LV :::; 3 LV Sheep/Cattle: > 3 LV :::; 3 LV
Interviewees Owner-Operator:
Sharemilker/-farmer:
Spouse present: Yes No
ManagerlContractmilker:
Consultant:
1985/86 1993
Number of family members living on the farm
Number of dependent children
Farmed before 1984
Number of years farming the present farm
Farm Details
yes no
farm size:
su
. . . . . . .. .. ha total su
........... sheep su beef su deer su goat
Ownership of:
- farmed land single owner family partnership non-family partnership
corporation other
number of owners: farm ownership of owners
working on property: %
- farm business owner of farmed land % sharemilker/-farmer
For Dairy Farmers only
number of cows milked:
production (kg of milkfat):
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cows milkedlIabour unit: .
productionlIabour unit: .
labour inpu~8 (I993/94): during busiest time
permanent labour( > 30 hours/week)
- owner/sharemilker/leaseholder
paid family
unpaid family
- non-fami~
part-time labour9 « 30 hours/week)
paid family
unpaid family
non-family
casual labour
paid family
unpaid family
casual non-family
contract labour
total full-time equivalents
contract labour for:
months with highest labour intensity:
months with lowest labour intensity:
normal during slack period
Interview Questions
1 How did the deregulation of the agricultural sector affect your farm profitability, your
household income, and your family asset.s·?
2a) What were your shOlt-term and long-term objectives during the years offarm recession?
b) What were the major changes implemented inyour household andfanning operation after
1985?
3 If the years offarm recession had continued, could you have taken further measures?
No Yes --- > What kind of measures?
4 Have your I1wnagement plans changed since deregulation?
No Yes --- > In what way?
,) Having farmed both in a regulated and deregulated agricultural sector, in which of the
f1.vo environments would you rather operate? WIUJ?
28 Full-time equivalents induding owner; part-time labour converted into full-time equivalents
29 TIle difference between part-time and casual employment is that the former is employed on a
regular basis, whereas the latter is not.
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6a) What are the reasons for having your particular farm size rather than having a smaller
or larger farm?
b) What do you consider to be the ideal size? Wiry?
7 Do you feel that your current form offarm organization has advantages in an economic
downturn over alternative forms?
No Yes --- > Why?
8 What kind of changes to your farm structure - in terms of labour, land, plant and
machinery - will you unde/take in the near future?
9 Do large farms have cost advantages over :·;mall farms or vice versa?
10 What stops you from increasing the size ofyour farm? What are the limiting factors?
11a) Does the running ofyour farm operation OJroduction process) require a cOI1...r;;iderable
amount of information?
No Yes
b) What kind of information?
c) How important is a goodflOlI' '?f information for the success ofyour farm operation?
not important important very important
12 What is hindering to a goodflow (~f information?
13 Do you think that the d(tficulty (~f maintaining a good flow of information rises faster
beyond a certain point?
No Yes --- > What is the threshold size of farm beyond which it becomes significantly more
complicated to ensure a good flow of information?
14a) Do you find it d(tficult to maintain a goodflow (if information between management and
labour?
No Yes --- > Why?
b) How do you exchange infonnation with your employees?
15 Factors which are constraining the farm size today; how important l-vill they be in the
future?
16 Do you see developments which could change the cost structure infavour of large versus
small farm..,,· or vice versa?
17 What are advantages offamity over hired labour, and vice versa?
18 Does a substitution of hired for famity labour incur extra costs?
No Yes ---- > What are the reasons for extra costs?
19a) Do you use incentive schemes or other labour management techniques to align labours'
interest with your own business interests?
No Yes --- > What kind?
b) How effective are incentive schemes?
ineffective effecti\'e very effective
92
20 Can you think of developments which would make labour management easier in the
future?
No Yes --- > What are these developments?
21 Is there a threshold size (~lfarm beyond which the short term flexibility is significantly
reduced?
No Yes --- > What is the size?
22 Could you convert your farm into a different type of farm (cropping, livestock etc.)
without incurring prohibitive costs?
Yes No --- > What are constraints preventing a change to a different production system?
23a) Is the production process in your industry seasonal or cyclical or L~; it characterised by
an even input/output flow without any idle periods for the production factors land,
capital, and labour?
b) How pronounced (in terms (if normal demand for input factors such as labour and
capital) and how long are these fluctuations?
c) How do you synchronize supply and demand of machinery and labour during the
production cycle?
24 Do the fluctuations of the demand for labour and machinery cause a problem for your
farm operation?
No Yes --- > Why?
25 Have past technological innovations substantially reduced the seasonality of the
production process?
No Yes --- > In what way?
26 Do you think that technological developments will reduce the seasonality or cyclical
nature of the biological production process significantly in the near future?
No Yes --- > What kind of technological developments?
27 In term..<; of "quality (if life", what LI,' important for you and your family?
28 What are the non-monetat)' benefits from your farming activities?
29 Do you think thatyou meet the criteria with which you described "quality of life" at least
as well or better with the monetary and non-monetat)' benefits you obtain from your
farming activities than with the benefits you would get from another job?
Yes No --- > What stops you from changing jobs?
30 Ifyou decided to do something els'e for a living other than farming, what would the trade-
o/ffor you and yourfamity be in terms (if monetat)' and non-monetary benefits?
31 During the years (iffarm rece5;sion a.lter 198-1. couldyou have found another job with at
least as good or a better 5:alw)' (monetaIY)?
No Yes --- > Why did you keep on farming in those adverse conditions after deregulation?
32 In the worst yean' (if recession, how much higher than your monetary income would a
salary have had to be before you would have considered leaving the farm and doing
something else for a living?
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33 How much higher than your pres'ent monetary income would a salary have to be before
you would consider leaving the farm and doing something else for a living?
34a) What do you con...<:;ider to be the .financial and other trade-off between being an owner-
operator, sharefarmer/milker orfarm manager?
b) If you had the choice, which pos'ition would you prefer? and wJijJ?
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APPENDIX 5
PROCEDURE AND RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE
Comparison of Means of Cost of Production per Kilogram of Milkfat
(PCFC_KMF) by Herd Size (HS)
Analysis of Variance Procedure
Class Level Information
Class
HS
Levels
11
Values
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Number of observations in data set = 203
PCFC KMF Mean
Dependent Variable: PCFC KMF
Sum of
Source DF Squares
Model 10 48.742781
Error 192 405.957832
Corrected Total 202 454.700613
R-Square C.V.
0.107198 26.41064
Mean
Square F Value
4.874278 2.31
2.114364
Root MSE
1.4541
Pr > F
0.0140
5.5057
Source
HS
DF
10
Anova SS Mean Square F Value
48.742781 4.874278 2.31
Pr > F
0.0140
T tests (LSD) for variable: PCFC_KMF
NOTE: This test controls the type I comparisonwise error rate not
the experimentwise error rate.
Alpha= 0.05 Confidence= 0.95 df= 192 MSE= 2.114364
Critical Value of T= 1.97240
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ,*** ,
Lower Difference Upper
HS Confidence Between Confidence
Comparison Limit Means Limit
4 - 3 -0.8362 1 .3854 3.6070
4 - 12 0.1210 1 .6021 3.0831 ***
4 - 5 0.2864 1.6468 3.0073 ***
4 - 10 0.7939 1.9144 3.0349 ***
4 - 11 0.5647 1 .9251 3.2856 ***
4 - 9 0.7985 1.9297 3.0608 ***
4 - 6 0.8692 1.9424 3.0155 ***
4 - 7 1.1974 2.1847 3.1721 ***
4 - 8 1.2775 2.2711 3.2646 ***
4 - 13 0.4737 2.3616 4.2496 ***
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3 - 4 -3.6070 -1.3854 0.8362
3 - 12 -2.1251 0.2167 2.5584
3 - 5 -2.0059 0.2614 2.5288
3 - 10 -1 .6031 0.5290 2.6611
3 - 11 -1 .7276 0.5397 2.8071
3 - 9 -1 .5934 0.5443 2.6820
3 - 6 -1 .5506 0.5570 2.6645
3 - 7 -1.2659 0.7993 2.8645
3 - 8 -1.1825 0.8857 2.9538
3 - 13 -1.6419 0.9762 3.5944
12 - 4 -3.0831 -1.6021 -0.1210 ***
12 - 3 -2.5584 -0.2167 2.1251
12 - 5 -1.5041 0.0448 1.5937
12 - 10 -1.0307 0.3123 1.6554
12 - 11 -1.2258 0.3231 1 .8720
12 - 9 -1 .0244 0.3276 1 .6796
12 - 6 -0.9635 0.3403 1 .6441
12 - 7 -0.6515 0.5827 1 .8169
12 - 8 -0.5701 0.6690 1 .9081
12 - 13 -1.2684 0.7596 2.7876
5 - 4 -3.0073 -1.6468 -0.2864 ***
5 - 3 -2.5288 -0.2614 2.0059
5 - 12 -1.5937 -0.0448 1 .5041
5 - 10 -0.9412 0.2676 1.4763
5 - 11 -1.1557 0.2783 1.7123
5 - 9 -0.9358 0.2828 1 .5015
5 - 6 -0.8695 0.2955 1 .4605
5 - 7 -0.5486 0.5379 1 .6244
5 - 8 -0.4679 0.6242 1. 7163
5 - 13 -1.2269 0.7148 2.6565
10 - 4 -3.0349 -1.9144 -0.7939 ***
10 - 3 -2.6611 -0.5290 1.6031
10 - 12 -1.6554 -0.3123 1 .0307
10 - 5 -1.4763 -0.2676 0.9412
10 - 11 -1.1980 0.0107 1.2195
10 - 9 -0.9281 0.0153 0.9586
10 - 6 -0.8449 0.0280 0.9009
10 - 7 -0.4947 0.2703 1 .0353
10 - 8 -0.4163 0.3567 1.1296
10 - 13 -1 .3346 0.4472 2.2290
11 - 4 -3.2856 -1.9251 -0.5647 ***
11 - 3 -2.8071 -0.5397 1 .7276
11 - 12 -1.8720 -0.3231 1 .2258
11 - 5 -1.7123 -0.2783 1.1557
11 - 10 -1.2195 -0.0107 1 . 1980
11 - 9 -1.2141 0.0045 1 .2232
11 - 6 -1.1478 0.0172 1.1822
11 - 7 -0.8269 0.2596 1 .3461
11 - 8 -0.7462 0.3459 1 .4380
11 - 13 -1.5052 0.4365 2.3782
9 - 4 -3.0608 -1.9297 -0.7985 ***
9 - 3 -2.6820 -0.5443 1.5934
9 - 12 -1.6796 -0.3276 1 .0244
9 - 5 -1 .5015 -0.2828 0.9358
9 - 10 -0.9586 -0.LJi53 0.9281
9 - 11 -1 .2232 -0.0045 1 .2141
9 - 6 -0.8739 0.0127 0.8993
9 - 7 -0.5255 0.2550 1 .0356
9 - 8 -0.4470 0.3414 1. 1297
9 - 13 -1 .3566 0.4320 2.2205
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6 - 4 -3.0155 -1.9424 -0.8692 ***
6 - 3 -2.6645 -0.5570 1 .5506
6 - 12 -1.6441 -0.3403 0.9635
6 - 5 -1.4605 -0.2955 0.8695
6 - 10 -0.9009 -0.0280 0.8449
6 - 11 -1.1822 -0.0172 1. 1478
6 - 9 -0.8993 -0.0127 0.8739
6 - 7 -0.4514 0.2424 0.9362
6 - 8 -0.3738 0.3287 1 .0312
6 - 13 -1 .3331 0.4193 2.1717
7 - 4 -3.1721 -2.1847 -1.1974 ***
7 - 3 -2.8645 -0.7993 1 .2659
7 - 12 -1.8169 -0.5827 0.6515
7 - 5 -1.6244 -0.5379 0.5486
7 - 10 -1.0353 -0.2703 0.4947
7 - 11 -1 .3461 -0.2596 0.8269
7 - 9 -1.0356 -0.2550 0.5255
7 - 6 -0.9362 -0.2424 0.4514
7 - 8 -0.4766 0.0863 0.6492
7 - 13 -1.5243 0.1769 1.8781
8 - 4 -3.2646 -2.2711 -1.2775 ***
8 - 3 -2.9538 -0.8857 1. 1825
8 - 12 -1.9081 -0.6690 0.5701
8 - 5 -1.7163 -0.6242 0.4679
8 - 10 -1.1296 -0.3567 0.4163
8 - 11 -1.4380 -0.3459 0.7462
8 - 9 -1.1297 -0.3414 0.4470
8 - 6 -1.0312 -0.3287 0.3738
8 - 7 -0.6492 -0.0863 0.4766
8 - 13 -1.6142 0.0906 1 .7954
13 - 4 -4.2496 -2.3616 -0.4737 ***
13 - 3 -3.5944 -0.9762 1.6419
13 - 12 -2.7876 -0.7596 1 .2684
13 - 5 -2.6565 -0.7148 1 .2269
13 - 10 -2.2290 -0.4472 1 .3346
13 - 11 -2.3782 -0.4365 1 .5052
13 - 9 -2.2205 -0.4320 1 .3566
13 - 6 -2.1717 -0.4193 1.3331
13 - 7 -1.8781 -0.1769 1 .5243
13 - 8 -1 .7954 -0.0906 1 .6142
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Comparison of Means of Cost of Production per Stock Unit (PC SU)
by Flock Size (FS)
Analysis of Variance Procedure
Class Level Information
Class Levels Values
FS 6 2 3 4 5 6 7
Number of observations in data set = 312
Dependent Variable: PC SU
Sum of Mean
Source DF Squares Square F Value Pr > F
Model 5 14665.034 2933.007 16.79 0.0001
Error 306 53444.896 174.657
Corrected Total 311 68109.930
R-Square C.V. Root MSE PC SU Mean
0.215314 28.35506 13.216 46.608
Source DF Anova SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F
FS 5 14665.034 2933.007 16.79 0.0001
T tests (LSD) for variable: PC_SU
NOTE: This test controls the type I comparisonwise error rate not
the experimentwise error rate.
Alpha= 0.05 Confidence= 0.95 df= 306 MSE= 174.6565
Critical Value of T= 1.96775
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ,***,
Lower Difference Upper
FS Confidence Between Confidence
Comparison Limit Means Limit
2 - 3 18.256 30.489 42.722 ***
2 - 4 29.245 41.026 52.807 ***
2 - 6 26.949 42.176 57.403 ***
2 - 5 33.821 45.934 58.047 ***
2 - 7 27.226 46.218 65.209 ***
3 - 2 -42.722 -30.489 -18.256 ***
3 - 4 6.303 10.537 14.771 ***
3 - 6 1 .151 11. 687 22.223 ***
3 - 5 10.361 15.445 20.530 ***
3 - 7 0.243 15.729 31 .215 ***
4 - 2 -52.807 -41.026 -29.245 ***
4 - 3 -14.771 -10.537 -6.303 ***
4 - 6 -8.858 1 .150 11 . 158
4 - 5 1 .035 4.908 8.782 ***
4 - 7 -9.940 5.192 20.323
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6 - 2 -57.403 -42.176 -26.949 ***
6 - 3 -22.223 -11.687 -1.151 ***
6 - 4 -11.158 -1. 150 8.858
6 - 5 -6.637 3.758 14. 154
6 - 7 -13.903 4.042 21.987
5 - 2 -58.047 -45.934 -33.821 ***
5 - 3 -20.530 -15.445 -10.361 ***
5 - 4 -8.782 -4.908 -1 .035 ***
5 - 6 -14.154 -3.758 6.637
5 - 7 -15.108 0.284 15.675
7 - 2 -65.209 -46.218 -27 . 226 ***
7 - 3 -31.215 -15.729 -0.243 ***
7 - 4 -20.323 -5.192 9.940
7 - 6 -21.987 -4.042 13.903
7 - 5 -15.675 -0.284 15.108
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